Mark Rossini: In Re: 911 (original English text)

by Mark Rossini

"...the arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice."
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1968)

"No lie can live forever".
Thomas Carlyle. (1843)

"There are no secrets that time does not reveal"
Jean Racine (1669)

In Re: 9/11

“What we do know is that government officials decided not to inform a lawfully constituted body, created by Congress and the president, to investigate one of the greatest tragedies to confront this country. We call that obstruction”. — Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, January 2, 2008, Chair and Vice-Chair of The 9-11 Commission

The Case:

The two questions that have never been addressed are: Why was the Central Intelligence Report (known as a CIR), drafted by FBI Special Agent Douglas J. Miller (who was detailed to the CIA’s Alec Station), which contained information about the “Terror Summit” in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in January 2000, suppressed and not sent to the FBI? And why was I told to shut up about it?

As in any case, an “incident” happens and then an investigation is launched, based upon Probable Cause, to determine “Why?” Directly connected to the “Why” is of course the motive or reason known as “mens rea”.

In the absence of a confession, all cases, civil or criminal, are proven based upon circumstantial evidence, which based upon their totality, would lead a “reasonable person” to conclude logically “the why” of an “incident” and ergo assign responsibility to an individual or a group for said act(s).

Addressing the two questions above, which are directly linked to the 9/11 attacks, I seek to prove the “Why”.


I believe it can be proven circumstantially that the reason why Doug’s CIR was suppressed, and I being ordered to not inform the FBI, was because the CIA was engaged in a recruitment operation along with the Saudi Arabian intelligence service known as the Mabahith, within the United States, of one or more of the terrorists who met in Malaysia, in direct violation of every applicable rule, regulation and law. Moreover, and perhaps the most pathetic and emotionally cringing part, is that they, the management of the CIA, Alec Station, and the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, (CTC), did not want the FBI, in the persona of FBI Special Agent-in-Charge John P. O’Neill, Jr., to interfere in their effort, and or the unilateral effort of the Mabahith, which the CIA would have had to have given permission for. Permission they had no legal authority to do. This recruitment effort/operation failed miserably, and resulted in the tragic attacks. O’Neill nor the FBI would have allowed such an operation to take place in the USA without the FBI’s management of it and approval from the Attorney General. The fear on the part of the CIA was that the FBI/O’Neill could not be controlled nor could be dissuaded from potentially making arrests and shutting down the operation when they saw fit, and thus causing the Saudi’s “embarrassment” (see below Page 4 and Page 13).

The failure of the recruitment operation, or perhaps the Mabahith stopped reporting and/or admitted their failure to the CIA, is the reason CIA/CTC representatives, along with an FBIHQ analyst, came up to FBI NY on or about June 11, 2001 and had a meeting (which I was not invited to) with my assigned squad, I-49, and requested help in finding the terrorists who attended the terror summit in Malaysia. The FBI Agents at the meeting were not told about the Malaysia terror summit, but just shown pictures of the terrorist attendees and asked to find them. When asked, the CIA/CTC representatives refused to say anything about the provenance of the photos, and refused to answer questions from the agents. Simple logical questions such as, “Who are these guys?”, “Where did you take these pictures, and why?” No answers were given. The only “answers” were “we can’t tell you that”. Specifically, pictures were shown of one member of the cell, Khalid al-Mihdhar, whom the CIA or Mabahith believed had been recruited or at least open to conversation/approach. Circumstantially it appears that what perhaps prompted this meeting in NY is that al-Mihdhar had returned to Yemen for quite some time (almost a year), and rebuffed the Mabahith/CIA.

Moreover, in the aforementioned meeting (attended by CIA, and the FBI’s Dina Corsi), the CIA would not tell the assembled FBI agents, nor then AUSA Dave Kelly (who left the meeting early due to the hostile atmosphere), why finding these men was so important (hence SA Steve Bongardt’s famous email to Corsi, wherein he warns her of the consequences that “—someday someone will die—"). Dina did not know at all about the recruitment effort. Dina just knew that the methodology by which the CIA knew about these terrorists was via an “intelligence method” (which Dina erroneously and innocently thought was protected then by the “wall”). We know that “intelligence method” was the NSA and CIA listening, albeit separately as revealed by Mike Scheuer’s (CIA Alec Station Chief) interview in the Spy Factory documentary [], to the telephone line in the home of Ahmed al-Hada in Sanaa, Yemen. A telephone number learned from FBI SA John Anticev’s interview with Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali in Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998.

Please take the time to read Jeff Stein’s recent Newsweek interviews of me [;], then watch the link immediately below which is an interview of former Presidential counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke. Please watch every second of it, and pay particular attention to minute 6:22, wherein Mr. Clarke provides a recitation of his conversation with Cofer Black, who at that time of their conversation was newly appointed as the Director of the CTC.

Clarke is unequivocal in this recorded interview, that when Cofer Black became the Director of the CTC, Black told Clarke “he was appalled that the CIA did not have any sources inside AQ, and he was determined to do something about that”. Could not the meeting of the hijackers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and the CIA’s knowledge that at least 2 of the attendees had visas to visit the USA, provide the perfect opportunity?

The record and open source reporting discloses that Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, or “Shakir el-Iraqi”, who was employed as a VIP greeter for Malaysia Airlines in KL, and whom facilitated Khalid al-Mihdhar’s arrival at the KL Airport, and later helped the other terror summit members navigate around KL, was approached by Malaysian authorities and the CIA for cooperation and recruitment []. That effort failed, so the CIA had to turn their focus on another member of the group. What better person to target than one who had a visa to visit the USA. By all indications it seems that Khalid al-Mihdhar was targeted for the very simple reason that his wife back in Yemen was pregnant. The hope and or logic being that he might have some shred of compassion or decency left in him.

Moreover, Richard Clarke stated at a terrorism and security conference at Fordham University (New York City) in May 2016, that he "believes the CIA attempted to recruit Mihdhar, Hazmi in California before 9/11".

What more information do we need in order to demand an official investigation and disclosure of this effort?

Lastly, the theory of recruitment is further given credence by former CIA Official Bruce Riedel during his interview in the two part documentary "Les Routes de La Terreur" by documentary filmmaker Fabrizio Calvi. Sadly the documentary never aired in the USA.

Links to my Google Drive for the English versions: Part 1 and Part 2.

When you watch, pay attention to Part 2 and the interview of Bruce Riedel regarding Saudi's who were suspected of being extremists. The statements of Mr. Riedel, though brief, are quite revealing and profound, and shed light on my reasoning. Mr. Riedel essentially states the "tacit policy" the USG had with Saudi Arabia regarding its subjects who were on the road to radicalization. The policy, in essence, was one whereby if the CIA identified a wayward Saudi, an attempt would be made to bring them back to the Kingdom for readjustment rather than arrest (which would have been very public). The sole purpose of this policy was to not cause the Kingdom embarrassment. What better opportunity to fulfill the CIA’s mission of recruitment and disruption, and keeping the Saudi’s happy, than the Malaysia Summit and the knowledge that at least two terrorists had visas to visit the USA?

As previously stated, SA Douglas J. Miller, wrote a draft CIR on January 5, 2000, that would have transmitted the information to the FBI about the meeting in Malaysia. This draft CIR was based upon a CIA cable that had come in from Kuala Lumpur Station which contained all the details surrounding the people who met there; who was followed, how and why it came to pass, ie., their travel through Dubai; how they were stopped there and searched “routinely” using the cooperation of the Dubai authorities; and how it was discovered that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi has visitors visas to enter the USA.

Doug wrote specifically that al-Mihdhar would likely be traveling soon to “most likely New York City” (this could only have been gleaned by the CIA if they had reviewed his visa application in Jeddah…which they did logically, since how would have Doug been able to put that in his cable?), and that he has been connected to the 1998 embassy bombings (an active FBI case at the time). He also wrote that photos of al-Mihdhar have been obtained and will be sent as well (meaning to the FBI) [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502].

Doug’s CIR did not contain all the CIA protected operational information/details as the KL cable which identified the several foreign liaison services and CIA Case Officers involved. This CIR was never released to the FBI. Again, the issue and main question is to try and understand who made the decision not to release it and why?

Since Doug's cable was not moving along the electronic queue line for eventual release we know from the historical and electronic record that after several days, Doug sent an electronic message to the Deputy Chief Alec Station (along with a copy of his draft CIR), asking if the draft cable he, Doug, wrote “Is this a no-go, or should I remake it in some other way?” The reason for Doug’s verbiage is that frequently communications are not released due to the fact that the CIA might feel there is too much “CIA proprietary or operational activity” revealed in the cable which might compromise the technique(s) used to gather the intelligence.

Doug never thought it was held up in the electronic queue for any other reason. Doug never received a direct response from the Deputy Chief of Alec Station. (Please keep in mind, as pointed out in the previous paragraph what was NOT in Doug’s cable, so the argument about not releasing Doug’s cable because it contained CIA proprietary information or sensitive collection technique(s) is bogus. Keeping in mind what WAS in Doug’s cable defies logic as to why it was not sent to the FBI).

After Doug's cable had passed through the electronic queue/inbox of an individual whom I shall use the pseudonym of "Agency Employee A". (who read it and then sent it to the Deputy Chief of Alec Station), he came to me and asked me if I could intervene and find out what was going on…why his communication was not moving from the inbox of the Deputy Chief of Alec Station. I approached "Agency Employee A" ("AEA"). "AEA" had in-depth knowledge of Yemeni terrorist cells and worked extremely close with the person Doug had sent that message to. I asked him/her why Doug’s cable was not moving along. I added that the FBI needs to informed of this. His/her response was that the information learned in KL “was not a matter for the FBI”. “The next AQ attack was going to be in SE Asia, and if and when we want to let the FBI know we will, and you are not to say anything”. I then said to this person, “Why then do they have visas to visit the USA?” His/her response was “if they come to the USA, it's just a diversion to throw us off.” After my conversation with "AEA" Doug did receive an electronic message from "AEA" saying "hold off now per Deputy Chief" Alec Station. For the record “AEA” and the Deputy Chief of Alec Station worked extremely close, and were seen as experts on the al-Qaeda threat/presence in Yemen. In fact there is verifiable information that they both traveled to Yemen in the spring of 1999 to discuss with Yemeni authorities the al-Qaeda presence there. Lastly and of most importance, according to the US DOJ/IG report dated November 2004, page 298-9, the Deputy Chief of Alec Station officially blocked Doug's CIR on January 5th.

Note two things regarding "AEA": Firstly, the 9/11 Commission, the JICI, the DOJ/OIG, and the CIA/OIG report that he/she wrote a cable January 6th 2000 to Malaysia Station, stating in substance "the information has been passed to our FBI partners". WHAT? Did he/she mean all the material that Doug had in his draft cable? If this is true...who? Who was it passed to or via? Not Doug or I. Moreover, why did this individual not ever come back to Doug or I asking what was the FBI doing with this information? Why is there no record in the FBI files of this information being passed/received? Why isn’t there any record of the FBI investigating it, or the FBI being asked to report back to the CIA on the status of the investigation, if any, that was done pursuant to this information being passed? It would seem logical that if such vital information “had been passed to our FBI partners”, it is therefore infinitely logical to conclude the FBI would have initiated some sort of investigation, and or at a minimum have a record of receiving the information. Last note: "AEA" does later admit he/she didn't “personally share the information with the FBI” (footnote 44 at page 502 of the 9/11 Commission Report). Ergo the contents of the cable he/she wrote was a lie, and there is no record anywhere of he/she being asked or giving an explanation.

At this very moment is when 9/11 could have been prevented. Yes…without question. To discount this is foolish. The cell would have been disrupted and perhaps the FBI and the CIA and the Mabahith could have worked together and developed one of the cell members as a source, but we will never know.

What we also have at this instance is a purposeful and willful decision by the CIA to withhold information from the FBI.

There is no excuse for it not being passed. The assignment of Doug and I to the CIA is and was totally irrelevant with respect to the CIA’s obligation to inform the FBI about the people meeting in Malaysia. Even if we were never assigned there, the CIA was obliged pursuant to every applicable law and executive order (EO 12333 comes to mind), to pass that information, and put the known terrorists with USA visas on a watch list, and let the FBI do its job by following them and conducting an investigation.

In order to build a circumstantial case, you have to draw upon facts and then make logical conclusions. Given the above (my known public and government testimony, albeit not before the 9/11 Commission, and that of Mr. Clarke’s interview), and what follows in this document, the case is even stronger.

Take a moment to study this:

July 12, 2001: Acting FBI Director Prevented by CIA from Telling Attorney General Ashcroft about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit:

On July 12, 2001, acting FBI Director Tom Pickard briefs Attorney General Ashcroft a second time about the al-Qaeda threat (see July 12, 2001). In a later letter to the 9/11 Commission discussing the meeting, Pickard will mention, “I had not told [Ashcroft] about the meeting in Malaysia since I was told by FBI Assistant Director Dale Watson that there was a ‘close hold’ on that info. This means that it was not to be shared with anyone without the explicit approval of the CIA.” During the briefing, Pickard also strongly recommends that Ashcroft be briefed by the CIA to learn details that Pickard feels he is not allowed to reveal. The “meeting in Malaysia” is an obvious reference to the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). Louis Freeh, the FBI director at the time of the summit, and other unnamed FBI officials were told some about the summit while it was taking place (see January 6, 2000). It is unknown if Pickard and Watson learned about it at that time, but Pickard’s letter shows they both knew about it by the time of this briefing. It is not known why the CIA placed a “close hold” on any mention of the Malaysian summit so strict that even the attorney general could not be told. Since two of the 9/11 hijackers attended that summit, sharing the information about the summit with other agencies may have helped stop the 9/11 attacks. [PICKARD, 6/24/2004]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, John Ashcroft, Thomas Pickard, Dale Watson

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

What is so troubling about the above is that the 9/11 Commission, to my knowledge, never followed up further on this. Nor did they question Tenet on it, whom 9/11 Commissioner Governor Tom Kean essentially called a liar in the Salon article. Former Governor Kean says for the record that Tenet “misled the 9/11 Commission”:

Regarding Tom Pickard’s testimony and Governor Kean’s un-coerced statements to the Salon authors, you have to ask yourself why was al-Mihdhar allowed to leave and go back to Yemen to his house?…the one in which the NSA was listening to, as was the CIA…the very same number from which they learned about the meeting in Malaysia? Why was al-Mihdhar allowed to come back to the USA? (He returned on July 4th, 2001 via JFK Airport).Why was he not turned back upon re-entry, or given to the FBI for interview and or investigation? Al-Mihdhar went back to Yemen in June 2000 for the birth of his child, and then spent some time in Mecca before going to Afghanistan in early 2001. During this time, he apparently lost his Saudi passport and got a new one….a new one in which Saudi authorities had implanted an electronic chip, which identified him as a potential danger to the Kingdom for Al-Qaeda affiliation. The logical conclusion ergo is that he was under watch by the Saudi Mabahith. Was it during this time the Mabahith realized they “lost” him, and they told the CIA, who then had an “uh-oh” moment, and then came up to FBI NY in June 2001 and said “find him”? Also please note that al-Mihdhar went to the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia for a new visa. It would have been a perfect opportunity for the the FBI Legat or an ALAT to speak with him. For more on al-Mihdhar:

In June/July 2001, the Deputy Chief of Alec Station, who was then detailed to the FBI’s ITOS (International Terrorism Operations Section) at FBIHQ requested, for unbeknownst reasons, analysts back at Alec Station to start retrieving and studying all known cables concerning al-Mihdhar. What prompted this? Was it the same reason(s) why the CIA went to FBINY in June 2001 and requested the FBI locate al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi? The only logical conclusion is that perhaps the Mabahith had told the CIA that they lost their tabs on al-Mihdhar, or that their recruitment effort had failed. Did the Mabahith inform the CIA that he got a new passport and had gone to NY? Has the 9/11 Commission seen every cable in CIA holdings about al-Mihdhar? Lastly, when the Deputy Chief of Alec Station was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission on live TV (their identity was hidden by a curtain), the Deputy Chief was asked “Why was the FBI not informed?” The Deputy Chief’s emotional response was “we were so overwhelmed, it just fell through the cracks.” I don’t accept their answer and neither should you. How could it have fallen “through the cracks” with all the cable traffic about it? How could it have “fallen through the cracks” when the resources of the CIA and several liaison services were utilized to engage and conduct surveillance on the Malaysia summit attendees in January 2000? How could it have "fallen through the cracks" if "AEA" passed along the note to Doug "hold off now per Deputy Chief"? How could it have “fallen through the cracks”, if the CIA came up to FBINY in June 2001 and asked the FBI to find al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi? How could it have “fallen through the cracks” if the Deputy Chief wrote in July 2001 about another attendee at the Malaysia Summit named Khallad bin Attash, that he was "a major league killer"? So if a "major league killer" was the terror summit along with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar why is the FBI not notified immediately of every single detail and holding? All the Deputy Chief of Alec Station had to do was get up from his desk and walk 10 feet to the office of FBI Section Chief Mike Rolince. Last point: It is common knowledge (numerous press reports and governmental inquiries) that the Chief of Alec Station had a meeting with Tenet and other senior CIA officials in July 2001 in which he warned that an attack was imminent and that "they are already here", referring of course to terrorists.

Per Pickard’s letter to the 9/11 Commission he was told by Dale Watson about some close held information regarding the meeting in Malaysia when he, Pickard, became the Acting FBI Director in July 2001. Watson further advised Pickard that he, Pickard, was forbidden from even informing then Attorney General John Ashcroft of this information. Question though: What was Dale actually told and by whom, and from whom did that person learn it from?…go down the evidentiary chain. Logically one would believe that Dale learned about it from Director Freeh who again, logically, was told it by George Tenet. One can assume Tenet told Freeh, that the CIA was developing information regarding a terrorist cell which had a meeting in KL, and “we (the Agency) will keep you appraised”. This does not constitute the passage of intelligence. Nor can it ever be construed by anyone in the Intelligence Community (IC), in its remotest form, as a formal passage of intelligence. As Mr. Clarke has pointed out, and Cofer Black’s own statement to me and others at the CIA:

“If it’s not on paper, it doesn’t exist”

Ergo, whatever Tenet told Freeh, who told Dale, who told Pickard, is not passage of CIA information that the FBI was expected to have acted upon. Moreover, it is logical to conclude that whatever Tenet told Freeh, it did not contain any information about terrorists in KL having US visas, since if it did the FBI would have been obligated, and demanded to act upon it. There is no way Director Freeh would not have marshaled all the resources of the FBI on this if he was told they had visas for the USA.

Also remember about how a senior Alec Station official is alleged to have lied to the JICI regarding his/her visit to FBIHQ. A visit in which he/she allegedly passed the information about the Malaysia meeting and all the intelligence regarding the visas held by al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi.

This person is allegedly the individual Jeff Stein writes about in his Newsweek story, and in the Salon article:

and the New Yorker article by Jane Mayer:


Suppose for a moment that it is true… that a certain alleged individual, as he/she allegedly claimed to the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry (JICI), went down to FBIHQ (even though no record is said to exist of his/her entry in the building; and to this day the FBI maintains visitors logs on paper; and it doesn’t matter who you are or what agency you visit from, you must show identification and sign in with a pen), and passed this vital and important information about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to a person, which conveniently and incomprehensibly, he/she supposedly cannot remember. Would you not logically think that he/she would have followed up with whomever they passed it to and inquire, "Hey what did you with that info about those two terrorists we followed halfway around the world?" Would not his/her superiors or subordinates at Alec Station, CTC, or other CIA stations want to know what the FBI was doing about terrorists who were in the USA? Might be in the USA? Or at a minimum had the ability to come to the USA? Moreover, the CIA knew after the Malaysia summit that they did come to the USA in March 2000. There are cables on the record acknowledging the arrival of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi from CIA Station Los Angeles to numerous domestic and foreign CIA stations, but no copy was sent to the FBI or Immigration/Customs.

There was no follow up by the CIA to the FBI, because the info was never passed. Once again, the answer to 9/11, is: Why was the information never passed formally for investigative action by the FBI?

One last note about “official passage of information” and CIR’s: If the information about the hijackers was passed in the manner/by the alleged person who is the subject of the Stein and Salon articles, as well as the logically assumed conversation between Tenet and Freeh, one has to wonder why it was not done in a formal CIR basis? How could something so vital and relevant to our nation's safety and security, not warrant being passed in the form of a CIR for investigative action by the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)? Neither the 9/11 Commission nor the JICI, to my knowledge, took a sample of every CIR that went from the CIA to the FBI, thirty days prior and thirty days after Doug drafted his cable. Then again why limit it to a 60 day window? Why not for a year? I doubt sincerely that any of those other CIR’s contained information as relevant, actionable, and urgent as the information contained in Doug’s suppressed CIR. The only “study” of CIR’s done by the 9/11 Commission was a tabulation of the amount of CIR’s sent by the CIA to the Intelligence Community (IC) member agencies.

When James Bamford approached FBIHQ in 2008 to have me appear in “The Spy Factory” documentary, Bamford was told that I could not be interviewed since, per then FBI Director Mueller, the relationship between the FBI and CIA was more important than my appearance in “The Spy Factory”….that my interview would create a rift and conflict which took years to heal in the wake of 9/11. I appeared in the documentary. Also, what is telling about the conversation between the FBI and Bamford, is that what I knew was not something I invented out of thin air, but something that needed to be contained and controlled. Something the 9/11 Commission didn't want to hear. I only bring up this last point since some people have claimed I made up the whole conversation with the person who forbade me to pass the document since I never said anything to the JICI or the DOJ/OIG. Just get my 2003 tape recorded testimony at FBIHQ with the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) which Director Mueller ordered to be done on each employee upon the release of the DOJ/OIG report. If I remember correctly I counted 7 Marantz tape recorders on the table, and even tapped the one directly next to me to make sure it was on.

To recap, an individual (allegedly the subject of the Stein, Salon and Mayer articles), is alleged to have lied about going down to FBIHQ and passing the information and we have to know why. He/she claiming they came to FBIHQ and passed it, albeit to an unknown person, and the assignment of Doug and I to Alec Station, has always been the CIA's fallback position to pass the buck of responsibility for the 9/11 attacks to the FBI. Curiously enough the Agency never points to the Pickard letter or the assumed conversation between Tenet and Freeh. Sadly in the public’s mind the FBI is to blame for the 9/11 attacks. This is in large part due to the CIA’s media campaign right after 9/11 pushing the fact that the FBI “knew”, and should have acted upon it.

No one could doubt that such an overt media strategy was being undertaken by the CIA. Just peruse the internet at the time. It seemed like every day, particularly in the Washington Post, there were little tidbits in articles to shape the CIA's image, while snubbing the FBI. The morale in the FBI during 2001 and 2002, was awful and the proverbial water-cooler conversations reflected that. We all knew that Director Mueller was doing, and did his best, to keep the FBI as an organization intact, and for that he deserves many accolades. There were almost daily calls by politicians for dismantling the FBI and creating a version of the British MI-5 and other incarnations. I can remember vividly giving a presentation to a civic group or being a panelist at a conference and being asked "Why did the FBI let 9/11 happen?” One person told me in a conversation "everybody knows the FBI is to blame" and this was in Madrid, Spain in 2006. Instead of dismantling the FBI, politicians created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), via the Homeland Security Act. The first paragraph of the Homeland Security Act states that the DHS has the mission to “Protect the Homeland”. This immediately created a direct conflict with Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 12333 concerning the FBI’s roles and responsibilities with regard to Terrorism investigations, but that's another discussion.

Getting back to the CIA's media campaign to put the blame squarely with the FBI, one has to wonder what exactly was truly going on and why this "push" by Tenet and the CIA's press office. I can't help but posture that the CIA was afraid of the truth getting out. Keep in mind the following:

1) No one in my unit (Alec Station) was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, not even the Chief of Alec Station, nor the person who told me keep silent about Doug’s memo. That person was sent out of the country on a long term assignment.

2) The only person defacto from Alec Station interviewed by the 9/11 Commission was the #2 of Alec Station who had been detailed to the FBI. The interview was aired live on TV with him/her behind a curtain to shield their identity. If he/she was never detailed to the FBI, I doubt the 9/11 Commission interview would have taken place.

3) The senior Alec Station executive who allegedly lied to the JICI about going down to the FBI building and passing the information to the FBI.

4) The Pickard letter.

I can't help but believe the CIA feared that if it was revealed the CIA ran a unilateral surveillance and recruitment operation on American soil, with the Saudi Mabahith, which failed, that in the extreme the whole CIA would have been abolished, and at "best" or perhaps “least” in some eyes, very senior CIA officials would have gone to jail. The abolishment of the CIA would have caused the equivalent of an earthquake in the American government structure domestically and internationally. The latter scenario of a CIA employee being prosecuted is a watershed of everything being revealed by a person upon whom so much secrecy has been entrusted to. Perhaps it’s best to protect them, keep the Agency intact and make the FBI the "fall guy”?

To add insult to injury, the subject of the aforementioned articles (Stein, Salon and Mayer) has been promoted. One has to question why...loyalty? Fear? Perhaps it's best described in another article by Jane Mayer in the New Yorker concerning the protection of the CIA employees involved in the Senate report on torture:

You can substitute Brennan for Tenet and Obama for Bush in this excerpt from the article:

Brennan had a single purpose, which was to not “lose Langley,” as people in Washington say, meaning that they didn’t want to alienate those still working at the C.I.A. This calculation—that C.I.A. officers, unlike soldiers, law-enforcement officers, and other public servants who risk their lives to serve the country, are too fragile for criticism, too valuable to fire, and too patriotic to prosecute—somehow tied the Obama Administration in knots.

The Sealed “28 Pages”

Lastly, there are the sealed “28 Pages” of the JICI Report concerning the “Saudi Presence in the USA”. This report describes a potential financial and tangential logistical support/connection between certain prominent Saudis (both royal and connected to the royal family) to the 19 hijackers, and or other close supporters of them. Individuals that the FBI was prohibited and prevented from interviewing because within days of the attacks, when no other aircrafts were allowed to fly, a plane went around the USA picking up these protected Saudis and taking them back to the Kingdom. Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife of Prince Bandar who was then Ambassador for Saudi Arabia to the USA, wrote checks for a period of time totaling near $130,000 that went to a charity, which funneled money to Omar al-Bayoumi, who was a Saudi “agent”, and with whom the hijackers contacted upon their arrival for “support”. Al-Bayoumi helped the hijackers move into an apartment in San Diego, by co-signing the lease and advanced them money to pay for the rent. The farcical reason why al-Bayoumi even helped them is that “he bumped into them at a restaurant” and “offered assistance as a good Muslim”. Refer to the extensive coverage of al-Bayoumi by Gil Reza of the San Diego Reader:

The reason why an un-redacted, declassified report (only an edited unclassified version has been released) has not been made public is for the obvious embarrassment to the Saudi regime (it would debase their divinely ordained legitimacy and rule over Islam. Part of the Saudi King's official title is the “Custodian of the two Holy Places”), and the subsequent economic and political fallout it would have on the US, and our government’s long term strategic political/economic agenda in the Middle-East and globe. To put it bluntly the oil spigot is more important than American lives. The facts are all there, but conscious avoidance has been the practice. We protect the Royal House of Al-Saud, who made a deal with puritanical Wahhabi zealots, in order to ensure the flow of oil. Right or wrong, these are the facts which causes everybody to look down at the floor when you mention them, and hope you'll go away and not interfere with their cheap tank of gas.

If and when the “28 Pages” (the full declassified version) are released perhaps (and maybe this is the fear and why they have been withheld) it will generate some honest debate, and investigation of why Alec Station withheld FBI Special Agent Doug Miller's CIR, and why I was told to shut up about it. As I wrote earlier, it was to recruit (more likely allow the Saudi Mabahith to do it for them or let the Saudi Mabahith have free hand and report back to the CIA) one of the 9/11 terrorists who met in Malaysia and/or at a minimum to learn what they were doing; to keep John O'Neill and the FBI in the dark about their efforts, and lastly to protect the Saudis from "embarrassment". It is as simple as that.

Conclusions, Considerations and Questions:

Surveillance and a recruitment effort by the CIA was done on US soil, and certain individuals lied about it.

Surveillance and a recruitment effort by the Saudi Mabahith was done on US soil, (specifically by Omar al-Bayoumi) with the express knowledge and unlawful “permission” of certain CIA officials, and certain individuals have lied about it.

There is one glaring example of a recruitment operation gone awry by a small group of CIA analysts who launched their own rogue recruitment operation utilizing retired FBI Special Agent Robert Levinson. Without authorization, a small cadre of analysts sent retired SA Levinson to Iran to meet with an American wanted for murder named David Belfield a.ka. Dawud Salahuddin, an effort to recruit him and or to see if he would return to America and face murder charges. Mr. Levinson’s is presumed to be dead, or in the custody of the Iranian government.

The 9/11 Commission was lied to.

The release of the Top Secret CIA/OIG report must be done, since perhaps in that document, the recruitment operation is revealed.

The classified sealed “28 Pages” of the JICI report concerning the Saudi presence in the USA prior to the 9/11 attacks must be released to the public.

What prompted the CIA to request the FBI to find al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in June 2001? What prompted the Deputy Chief of Alec Station to task personnel to start reviewing all cable traffics in  July 2001 about al-Mihdhar and the Malaysia Terror Summit?

If we had the temerity and ability to finally confront the truth about “Why” the attacks happened in light of the above, a new commission or committee would be convened.

Oil and politics is more important than nearly 3,000 lives lost, and thousands more physically and emotionally scarred.

P.S.: Let’s not forget the murder of Muhammed Jamal Khalifa (Bin Laden’s brother-in-law) in Madagascar in January 2007, who was killed within an hour of his arrival there. The only thing stolen was his computer, not the nearly $30,000 in cash he had in his pocket. The computer is said to have contained his ledgers and the identities of donors from the Saudi Kingdom.

Jamal had emailed me just prior to his death in January 2007 to wish me a Happy New Year. We had established contact in 2005 via phone, when author Lawrence Wright was in Jeddah interviewing Khalifa for his book “The Looming Tower”. Wright had told Khalifa about me, and they called my CIA issued cell phone using Khalifa’s cell phone. In our phone call, Khalifa asked for me to meet him in the Kingdom so he could “explain it all”, that he was “not a bad man”, and “not the person you think I am”. The FBI requested permission for me and another Special Agent to go meet him, but permission from the US and Saudi government’s was denied.

Nessun commento: