This is a partial and ongoing list of the main intelligence failures that allowed al-Qaeda to carry out the 9/11 attack.
The Phoenix Memo
The Phoenix Memo is a note sent in July 2001 by former FBI agent Kenneth Williams to various intelligence agencies, in which he reported that Saudi citizens in Arizona had for years been attending flight schools and distributing materials in mosques and universities praising Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda (details).
The communication was not treated with the necessary priority, both because there was no concrete or specific threat and because investigators’ attention was diverted by the case of serial arsonist Mark Warren Sands.
The Terror Summit in Kuala Lumpur
Between January 5 and 8, 2000, a meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, between several al-Qaeda members with the aim of organizing major terrorist attacks to be carried out in the following years.
The meeting was organized by Riduan Isamuddin, known by the alias Hambali, who invited four al-Qaeda members chosen by bin Laden to carry out an attack using airplanes: Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad), and Abu Bara al-Yemeni. The first two would later be among the five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon.
Khallad’s main purpose in the Malaysian capital, however, was not to attend the summit, but to conduct some tests on airline security. On December 31, he flew to Bangkok and the next day traveled to Hong Kong on a U.S. commercial flight; he bought a first-class ticket, hoping to get a view inside the cockpit, but the assigned seat didn’t allow him to. In addition, Khallad brought a letter opener in his carry-on luggage, inside a bag with his toiletries. The following day, he returned to Bangkok from Hong Kong, and at the security checkpoint, the inspectors examined his carry-on and the bag with the letter opener, but only glanced through it and let him pass. During the flight, Khallad waited until the other first-class passengers had fallen asleep, then took out the bag—and no flight attendant raised any objection.
At that time, the CIA was already tracking the two hijackers, who had U.S. visas, and continued surveillance during the four days of the summit. The two were also photographed by the CIA, with the support of the Malaysian authorities. The CIA was also aware that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi held visas to enter the U.S., but did not inform the INS, which could have blocked them at entry, nor did it inform the FBI, which could have tracked them within the U.S. to understand their intentions. The CIA asked the INS only on August 21, 2001, to check whether the two suspects were trying to enter the U.S., but received confirmation that they had already arrived. At that point, the agency asked the FBI to find them—but there wasn’t enough time.
Al-Qaeda’s switchboard in Sana'a, Yemen
In the mid-1990s, al-Qaeda set up a command center in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, which was mainly used as a communication hub. The structure was equipped with a Compact M satellite phone that could connect to the Inmarsat satellite phone network. The device was used to coordinate many of al-Qaeda’s most important operations. American investigators became aware of the existence of this base between 1996 and 1998.
The CIA monitored the phone in the Sana'a house and obtained information about al-Qaeda’s activities such as the terror summit that would be held in Malaysia in January 2000. However, the CIA did not share the gathered information with the FBI but only with the Saudi intelligence services, through which it learned that the two were linked to al-Qaeda. Thanks to this information, some CIA agents were able to enter the hotel room in Dubai where al-Mihdhar had stayed during his trip to Malaysia; the agents photocopied the terrorist's passport and discovered he had a visa to enter the U.S.—but again, they did not inform the FBI or the State Department.
FBI Special Agent Doug Miller’s memo about al-Bayoumi blocked by the CIA at Alec Station
The CIA’s Alec Station, established in 1996 to investigate Osama bin Laden, blocked the transmission of a memo by former FBI Special Agent Doug Miller—who was working with the CIA at that station—which would have informed the Bureau about the Terror Summit in Malaysia. The likely reason is that, had the FBI been informed, it might have interfered with a recruitment operation Omar al-Bayoumi (a Saudi intelligence agent) was conducting in California targeting Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
Former FBI Special Agent Mark Rossini spoke extensively about it in his document on Saudi involvement.
This was likely the biggest and most important intelligence failure that led to 9/11.
The FBI’s preliminary investigation of al-Bayoumi in 1998
In 2001, the name Omar al-Bayoumi was not new to investigators; in fact, the FBI had conducted a preliminary investigation into him back in 1998. According to the Department of Justice report A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (which evaluates the FBI's handling of intelligence gathered before 9/11), al-Bayoumi’s name first came to the FBI’s attention in 1995 during another investigation, though no details are provided. On August 31, 1998, the FBI was contacted by the manager of the San Diego complex where he lived, who reported suspicious activity involving the Saudi.
However, the FBI found no connection between al-Bayoumi and Islamic terrorism, and there was no basis to believe he posed a threat. On June 7, 1999, the preliminary investigation into Omar al-Bayoumi was closed.
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