The CIA Has Released More Than Seventy President's Daily Briefs Predating 9/11

La versione in italiano di questo articolo è disponibile qui.

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the CIA released seventy-one President's Daily Briefs (the President's daily intelligence report, often abbreviated as PDB) dating from the period between February 13, 1998 and September 12, 2001. The period covered therefore refers to the Clinton and Bush administrations. The documents are still heavily redacted, but they nevertheless contain a great deal of important information about the terrorist threats posed by al-Qaeda to the United States and about Osama bin Laden's role in Afghanistan.

The documents are available both as a complete collection and as individual PDFs.

Many of the documents report that bin Laden was developing chemical and biological weapons through al-Qaeda's ties with companies considered legitimate and that he was planning various types of attacks against American targets, both in the United States and in other countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Malaysia. The President's Daily Brief of July 3, 1998 reports that al-Qaeda was considering an attack against a shopping mall in Washington, the kidnapping of a person whose name is redacted, and the possibility of carrying out unspecified attacks against U.S. targets in foreign countries and in the cities of New York and Washington. Other documents dating from the final months of 1998 instead report al-Qaeda's intentions to carry out attacks involving aircraft, that terrorists linked to al-Qaeda were training to hijack aircraft, and that bin Laden intended to crash an aircraft loaded with explosives into an American city. On July 21, 1999, it was also reported that al-Qaeda had conducted a dry run for an attack against FBI Headquarters.

The released documents also reveal how bin Laden had an active role in drug production and the drug market, having financially supported, with the contribution of expert scientists, the development of highly addictive drugs such as methamphetamines and ecstasy. This information contradicts what was reported by the 9/11 Commission in the 9/11 Commission Report, which states in the chapter A Money Trail? that there was no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking.

Another aspect that emerges is the often-conflictual relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar, also due to bin Laden's intentions to attack the United States. On May 7, 1999, it was reported that the Mullah was becoming increasingly annoyed by bin Laden's presence and was seeking ways to expel him. The July 26 memo reports that bin Laden had promised the Taliban that he had no intention of attacking the United States first, but only in response to American actions in Afghanistan, an event that the Pakistani press considered imminent. However, the Taliban themselves were skeptical about the truthfulness of the terrorist's promise and had prevented bin Laden from speaking to Western journalists to prevent him from using the media as a means of issuing threats. The following year, the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban appeared even more complex, with reports that the Mullah had sentenced to death some government officials who had opposed the decision to host bin Laden in Afghanistan.

The August 17, 2000 PDB again reported that nervousness was growing within the Taliban government over bin Laden's presence and that the Mullah complained that al-Qaeda was becoming too radical, a concern that sounds rather bizarre coming from the leader of one of the world's most extremist governments. The Mullah had nevertheless ruled out expelling him for the time being, also considering that handing him over to the United States would increase external pressure over human rights and would be of no help to the Kabul government. The Mullah had also rejected bin Laden's proposal to pay Taliban fighters $100 a month, to prevent them from becoming more loyal to al-Qaeda than to the government itself. On March 26, 2001, the CIA note confirmed that the Taliban had no intention of handing bin Laden over to the United States except in exchange for economic aid for the reconstruction of the country and recognition of their government.

The collection also contains the now-famous Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US memo from August 2001, published in 2004, according to which al-Qaeda operatives in the United States were preparing to carry out hijackings, and it concludes with the Situation Report of September 12, 2001, the day after the attacks, which reports that there was strong evidence that al-Qaeda intended to carry out devastating attacks against American targets. The memo adds that bin Laden had had a major confrontation with Mullah Omar, to whom he had reported that he was planning an attack that would cause serious damage to the United States. Bin Laden had also moved from Kandahar to Kabul, possibly expecting a military operation in the city where he was known to be located.

The released documents therefore show that the CIA was well aware that al-Qaeda was planning attacks against American targets, including within the United States itself, and confirm that, as also noted by the 9/11 Commission Report, the greatest intelligence failure was the failure to connect the information and to share it with the other investigative agencies.

La CIA ha rilasciato 71 President's Daily Brief precedenti all'11/9

The English version of this article is available here.

In occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario degli attentati dell'11 settembre, la CIA ha rilasciato settantuno President's Daily Briefs (il rapporto quotidiano del Presidente, spesso abbreviato con l'acronimo PDB) risalenti al periodo compreso tra il 13 febbraio 1998 e il 12 settembre 2001. Il lasso temporale coperto fa quindi riferimento alle amministrazioni Clinton e Bush. I documenti sono ancora largamente censurati, ma contengono comunque molte informazioni importanti sulle minacce terroristiche che al-Qaeda rappresentava per gli USA e anche sul ruolo di Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

I documenti sono disponibili sia come lotto integrale che come pdf singoli.

Molti dei documenti riportano che bin Laden stava sviluppando armi chimiche e biologiche attraverso le relazioni di al-Qaeda con aziende considerate legittime e che stava pianificando attentati di vario genere contro obiettivi americani, sia negli USA sia in altri Stati come Pakistan, Arabia Saudita, Libano o Malesia. Il President's Daily Brief del 3 luglio 1998 riferisce che al-Qaeda stava valutando un attentato contro un centro commerciale a Washington, il rapimento di una persona il cui nome è censurato e la possibilità di condurre attacchi non meglio specificati contro obiettivi USA in Stati esteri e nelle città di New York e Washington. Altri documenti risalenti agli ultimi mesi del 1998 riportano invece le intenzioni di al-Qaeda di condurre attentati con aerei, che terroristi legati ad al-Qaeda si stavano addestrando a dirottare aerei e che bin Laden intendeva far schiantare un aereo con esplosivi in una città americana. Il 21 luglio 1999 viene anche riportato che al-Qaeda aveva condotto un dry run di un attentato contro il quartier generale dell'FBI.

Dai documenti rilasciati emerge anche come bin Laden avesse un ruolo attivo nella produzione e nel mercato della droga, avendo sostenuto finanziariamente e con il contributo di scienziati esperti lo sviluppo di droghe che danno forte dipendenza, come le metanfetamine e l'ecstasy. Queste informazioni contraddicono quanto riportato dalla 9/11 Commission nel 9/11 Commission Report, in cui scrive nel capitolo A Money Trail? che no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking [non ci sono prove credibili che Bin Laden sia stato coinvolto nel o che abbia tratto finanziamenti dal traffico di droga].

Un altro aspetto che emerge è il rapporto spesso conflittuale tra bin Laden e il Mullah Omar, dovuto anche alle intenzioni di bin Laden di colpire gli USA. Il 7 maggio 1999 viene riportato che il Mullah era sempre più infastidito dalla presenza di bin Laden e che stava cercando soluzioni per espellerlo. Il memo del 26 luglio riporta che bin Laden avrebbe promesso ai Talebani di non avere intenzione di attaccare gli USA per primo, ma solo in risposta ad azioni americane in Afghanistan, evento che la stampa pakistana riteneva imminente. Tuttavia gli stessi Talebani erano scettici sulla veridicità di tale promessa del terrorista e avevano impedito a bin Laden di parlare con giornalisti occidentali per evitare che usasse i media come mezzo per inviare minacce. L'anno seguente il rapporto tra al-Qaeda e i Talebani apparve ancora più complesso, con la notizia che il Mullah avesse condannato a morte alcuni funzionari del suo governo che si erano opposti alla decisione di ospitare bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Il PDB del 17 agosto 2000 riferiva di nuovo che nel governo dei Talebani cresceva il nervosismo per la presenza di bin Laden e che il Mullah lamentava il fatto che al-Qaeda stesse diventando troppo radicale, preoccupazione che suona quantomeno bizzarra se espressa dal leader di uno dei governi più estremisti del mondo. Il Mullah comunque aveva per il momento escluso la possibilità di espellerlo, anche considerando che consegnarlo agli USA avrebbe aumentato la pressione esterna per i diritti umani e non sarebbe stata di alcun aiuto per il governo di Kabul. Il Mullah aveva anche respinto la proposta di bin Laden di pagare 100 dollari al mese ai combattenti talebani, per evitare che questi diventassero più fedeli ad al-Qaeda che al governo stesso. Il 26 marzo 2001 la nota della CIA confermava che i Talebani non avevano intenzione di consegnare bin Laden agli USA se non in cambio di aiuti economici per la ricostruzione del Paese e del riconoscimento del loro governo.

Il lotto contiene anche l'ormai celeberrimo memo Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US dell'agosto del 2001, pubblicato nel 2004, secondo cui persone di al-Qaeda negli USA si stavano preparando a compiere dei dirottamenti, e si chiude con il Situation Report del 12 settembre 2001, il giorno dopo gli attentati, che riporta che ci fossero forti evidenze del fatto che al-Qaeda avesse intenzione di condurre attentati distruttivi contro obiettivi americani. Il memo aggiunge che bin Laden aveva avuto un forte scontro con il Mullah Omar al quale aveva riferito di stare pianificando un attentato che avrebbe fatto gravi danni agli Stati Uniti. Bin Laden si era anche spostato da Kandahar a Kabul, forse aspettandosi un'operazione militare nella città in cui era noto che si trovasse.

Dai documenti rilasciati emerge quindi come alla CIA fosse ben noto che al-Qaeda stesse pianificando attentati contro obiettivi americani anche all'interno degli USA stessi e conferma come il più grande degli errori di intelligence sia stato, come rilevato anche dal 9/11 Commission Report, non aver unito le informazioni e non averle condivise con le altre agenzie investigative.

Una voce che Vale, episodio sull'11 settembre 2001

In occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario dell'11 settembre, sono stato ospite della puntata di questo mese del podcast Una voce che Vale, realizzato dai giornalisti Valentina Calzavara e Andrea Dossi. Il mio intervento inizia circa al minuto 39 e riguarda gli errori di intelligence che hanno permesso che gli attentati avvenissero, in particolare descrivo il caso di Omar al-Bayoumi.

Gli altri ospiti della puntata sono:

• Ruggero De Rossi, sopravvissuto all’attacco (intervistato in passato anche su questo blog)
• Maria Teresa Cometto e Glauco Maggi, giornalisti italiani a New York
• Gabriella Calvi, sorella di una vittima
• Giulio Picolli, ricercatore italiano che vive negli USA che si è impegnato nel ricostruire le storie delle vittime di origine italiane sul suo sito web
• Tiziana Ferrario, che condusse lo speciale del TG1
• Emilio Iodice, diplomatico americano richiamato che fu richiamato con urgenza da Parigi a Washington

La puntata è disponibile su Spotify a questo indirizzo.

Ringrazio Valentina e Andrea per l'interesse dimostrato e per il lavoro che hanno realizzato.

Responding to 9/11 with Former Police Officer David Berez

For the 25th anniversary of September 11, 2001 I’m sharing a new interview with former police officer David Berez, who responded to the attacks and made his way to Ground Zero that day.

David takes us through his experience chronologically, from waking up to the news that America was under attack, to arriving at Ground Zero and witnessing the devastation firsthand. He recalls working alongside police officers, firefighters, and paramedics, the days of search and rescue that followed, and the extraordinary sense of unity that emerged on September 12.

The following photographs, taken at Ground Zero on the day of the attacks, were provided by David Berez himself.

Military Judge Rules KSM’s Statement Inadmissible

La versione in italiano è disponibile qui.

The trial of the planners of the September 11, 2001 attacks is scheduled to begin on June 5, 2028, despite the prosecutors' initial request for a January 2027 start date. The delay is due to several pretrial proceedings, including the determination of which evidence is admissible.

The defendants will be tried by a U.S. military commission, as part of the Military Commissions system established by the Bush administration after the attacks and subsequently regulated by Congress. The proceedings are being held at the Guantanamo base. As of today, the presiding judge, the fifth to oversee this proceeding, is Lieutenant Colonel Michael Schrama of the U.S. Air Force.

The defendants are:

• Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: the principal planner.
• Ammar al-Baluchi: whose role was to send money to the hijackers while they were in the U.S. through wire transfers from the UAE.
• Walid bin Attash: a combat trainer of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, he had also conducted dry runs of aviation security in Asia.
• Mustafa al-Hawsawi: organizer of travel and money transfers.

In August of this year, Judge Schrama ruled inadmissible the statement given by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to the FBI in 2007 because it had not been obtained voluntarily, but under torture by the CIA. The FBI also allegedly failed to inform Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that he had the right to remain silent and consult an attorney. In 2025, the previous judge, Matthew N. McCall, had ruled al-Baluchi's testimony inadmissible for similar reasons. The same McCall ruled in 2023 that the designated fifth defendant, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, coordinator of the Hamburg cell, was unable to stand trial because of post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the torture inflicted during his interrogations.

The New York Times reports that the leader of the prosecution team, Rear Admiral Aaron C. Rugh, said in a press communication that he and his colleagues are considering whether to appeal the decision to exclude Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's testimony, which is obviously a very valuable weapon in the hands of the prosecution. An appeal could cause a further delay to the trial date.

It unfortunately therefore appears clear that the extreme interrogation techniques adopted by the CIA and the Bush administration did not contribute to finally bringing the planners of the attacks to trial, but instead significantly slowed the course of justice and continue to obstruct it. Moreover, this is not the first time the five defendants have been brought before a military commission: the first time was in 2008 at Guantanamo. In 2009, the Obama administration announced its intention to try them in a federal court in New York, but the proceedings did not take place, and in 2011 the case was once again referred to the military commissions. The wait could become even longer.

Sources:

• New York Times, August 26, 2026
• New York Times, August 28, 2026
• Washington Post, August 26, 2026
• New York Post, August 28, 2026
• Lawdragon, August 28, 2026

Il giudice militare dichiara inammissibile la dichiarazione di KSM

An English version is available here.

È fissato per il 5 giugno del 2028 l'inizio del processo nei confronti dei pianificatori degli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001, nonostante la data iniziale chiesta dai procuratori fosse gennaio del 2027. Il motivo del rinvio sta in diverse fasi del pre-contenzioso, tra cui la decisione di quali siano le prove ammissibili.

Gli imputati verranno giudicati da una commissione militare statunitense, nell'ambito del sistema delle Military Commissions istituito dall'Amministrazione Bush dopo gli attentati e successivamente disciplinato dal Congresso. Il procedimento si svolge nella base di Guantanamo. A oggi il giudice assegnato, il quinto a presiedere questo procedimento, è il Tenente Colonnello Michael Schrama della US Air Force.

Gli imputati sono:

• Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: il principale dei pianificatori.
• Ammar al-Baluchi: il cui ruolo fu di inviare soldi agli attentatori mentre si trovavano negli USA attraverso bonifici dagli Emirati.
• Walid bin Attash: addestratore al combattimento di al-Hazmi e al-Mihdhar, aveva anche condotto dei dry run sulla sicurezza aerea in Asia.
• Mustafa al-Hawsawi: organizzatore dei viaggi e dei trasferimenti di denaro.

Ad agosto di quest'anno il giudice Schrama ha dichiarato inammissibile la dichiarazione rilasciata da Khalid Shaikh Mohammed all'FBI nel 2007 perché non era stata ottenuta spontaneamente, ma sotto tortura da parte della CIA. L'FBI non avrebbe inoltre comunicato a Khalid Shaikh Mohammed che era suo diritto rimanere in silenzio e consultare un avvocato. Nel 2025 il giudice precedente, Matthew N. McCall, aveva dichiarato inammissibile la testimonianza di al-Baluchi per motivi simili. Lo stesso McCall aveva dichiarato nel 2023 il designato quinto imputato Ramzi bin al-Shibh, coordinatore della cellula di Amburgo, incapace di sostenere un processo a causa dello stress post traumatico causatogli dalle torture degli interrogatori.

Il New York Times riporta che il leader del gruppo dei procuratori, il Controammiraglio Aaron C. Rugh, ha dichiarato in una comunicazione alla stampa di stare valutando insieme ai suoi collaboratori se sia opportuno fare appello alla decisione di non ammettere la testimonianza di Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, che è ovviamente un'arma molto preziosa nelle mani dell'accusa. Il ricorso  potrebbe causare un ulteriore rinvio della data del processo.

Appare purtroppo quindi chiaro che le tecniche estreme di interrogatorio adottate dalla CIA e dall'Amministrazione Bush non abbiano contribuito a portare finalmente in giudizio i pianificatori degli attentati, ma al contrario abbiano notevolmente rallentato il percorso della giustizia e lo stiano tuttora ostacolando. Del resto non è la prima volta che i cinque imputati vengono portati davanti a una commissione militare: la prima volta avvenne nel 2008 a Guantanamo. Nel 2009 l'Amministrazione Obama annunciò l'intenzione di processarli davanti a una corte federale di New York, ma il procedimento non ebbe luogo e nel 2011 il caso venne nuovamente affidato alle commissioni militari. L'attesa potrebbe ancora allungarsi.

Fonti:

• New York Times, 26 agosto 2026
• New York Times, 28 agosto 2026
• Washington Post, 26 agosto 2026
• New York Post, 28 agosto 2026
• Lawdragon, 28 agosto 2026

Inside the Buffalo FBI - 9/11/01

La traduzione in italiano è disponibile qui.

I am publishing below the account of Peter Ahearn, former Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Buffalo Field Office, describing what happened in his division while the attacks were underway. It is an invaluable account for understanding the chaos, confusion, and courage of those who found themselves, entirely unexpectedly, having to defend their nation against the most devastating terrorist attack in history.

Arriving at the Buffalo FBI office in May of 2001 as a newly appointed FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), I could not believe how fortunate I was. I arrived to an FBI field division that was extremely busy with some incredible case work, minimal administrative issues and a very positive and talented workforce which continues today. Buffalo FBI was not a “sleepy hollow”, ranked 34 out of 56 in relative size of FBI field divisions, with 86 Agents, 7 Analysts and 130 or so support personnel spread out in four satellite offices with responsibility for all 17 counties of Western New York. When I left in 2006 the complement had gone to 119 Agents, 14 Analysts and 175 support personnel, with 5 active task forces combining federal, State and Local law enforcement around Western New York. These task forces were the Joint Terrorism task force, Cyber crime/intelligence Task Force, Crimes Against Children Task Force, the Health Care Fraud Task Force and the Safe Streets/Violent Crime Gang task force.

The investigative priorities of the division were set by a combination of techniques. Crime surveys, past investigative activity and intelligence analyzed by investigative and intelligence programs. White Collar Crime, Organized Crime and Drugs, Violent Crime, Counterintelligence and yes, Terrorism was the key programs. Of the 86 FBI Agents assigned in May of 2001, I was allocated by FBI Headquarters a total of 4 Agents to be assigned Terrorism Program matters: one for International Terrorism matters and 3 for Domestic Terrorism. Why so many for Domestic Terrorism? The FBI defines domestic terrorism as groups that are spawned within the U.S. and no international ties. The KKK, PETA/ELF, Aryan Nation, Militia groups, Anti-Abortion violent organizations, are examples of the domestic groups. Buffalo FBI had dealt with its share of domestic terror. Timothy McVeigh was from the WNY region. Barnett Slepian was an American physician and OB/GYN who was murdered in his Amherst home by anti-abortion militant James Charles Kopp, captured in France a month before my arrival. Allocations of resources by the FBI are in line with the amount of documented work in FBI field offices back then. Very little international terrorism was found in the domain of WNY at the time or shall I say at the time we knew then. Today the ten priorities of the FBI are set and do not change with resources allocated directly to the top three: preventing terrorist attacks, the counterintelligence threat posed by hostile intelligence services and cybercrime.

As the SAC, I was responsible for ensuring my priorities were correct and allocate resources effectively and efficiently to address them. The FBI Inspection Division spent two weeks in June of 2001 looking at the past three years of FBI Buffalo operations, intelligence base, administration and priorities, issuing findings that all were effective and efficient. From that point on, my job was to ensure the “ship stayed on course” and as our division mantra noted, we just wanted to “raise the bar” on what we were doing and how we accomplished executing our mission.

In July 2001 as my personal review of FBI program operations for Buffalo FBI was in its final stages, I attended my first FBI-sponsored terrorism working group for Western New York. This group, coordinated by the Buffalo FBI, met monthly to discuss terrorism issues and concerns and was attended by our federal law enforcement partners and some local police departments. The working group was somewhat informal and similar to several other working groups we had such as the Bank Robbery working group, financial fraud working group among others. At the conclusion of the meeting, I was driving my Immigration and Naturalization SAC counterpart (remember this was INS, pre-ICE) back to his office. We discussed the idea of formalizing the working group into an FBI-sponsored Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) like those only found in larger offices. JTTFs began in 1979 with the first formed in the FBI New York Office to deal with a domestic terrorism case called NYROB, the armored car robbery in Nyack, NY by members of the Black Panther/Weatherman where two Nyack police officers were killed. With WNY's proximity to the border and a more structured need to look at terrorism, the JTTF would give INS, Customs, Border Patrol, NY State Police and the FBI a way to formalize relationships, combine scarce resources and better coordinate initiatives. I realized, as he did, we were severely understaffed and this would be a way to alleviate our problems. With a JTTF hopefully came resources or, as we say in the FBI, more cars and more bodies.

That afternoon, I met with my Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), the terrorism program coordinator/supervisor and my one international terrorism Agent, Ed Needham, to discuss the idea. SA Needham was a former FBI supervisor who stepped out of the FBI Career Development Program to return home to Buffalo, NY. At the time, I did not realize how fortunate I was to have a talent like SA Needham who had such deep experience in terrorism matters. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that our JTTF request would be formalized and sent to the FBI Terrorism Division at FBIHQ. I signed out the request paperwork to FBIHQ the second week or so of August, now a month before 9/11. We were very timely I realized later. Within 3 weeks of 9/11, FBI Buffalo became the first FBI Division authorized to create a JTTF post 9/11. Today they are in every one of the FBI’s 58 field offices nationwide. In actuality, the morning of 9/11 I only had one agent dedicated to international terrorism. By 9:10 of 9/11, the whole FBI was working terrorism.

At the time, the most notable issue our one International Terrorism Agent, Ed Needham, was an anonymous letter from a U.S. citizen of Muslim faith describing in detail several individuals who had traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to train in Bin Laden’s terror camps. This later became known as the Lackawanna Six.

During one of my visits to FBIHQ in August of 2001, I ran into Tom Picard, FBI Deputy Director. We had a brief hallway discussion about how things were going in Buffalo. I told him I was lucky to have a great division, some great work and great people and law enforcement relationships with minimal issues. I noted the border issues, and I mentioned trying to get JTTF authorization. Right away his demeanor changed, concern was all over his face. He mentioned discussions with the intelligence community, telling me there was belief that some type of attack was coming, but the belief was it was focused overseas. He also mentioned we, the FBI, were looking for unknown individuals in the U.S. that could be part of a plot. He was frustrated at the lack of information available from the intelligence community. There were no names or anything of detail to go on. I sensed deep concern and fear of the unknown. As I have always said, it is not what I know that keeps me up at night as an SAC; it is what I do not know. I had also heard on that trip, the FBI’s budget, especially the terrorism budget, was going to be cut by 40% for Fiscal Year 2002. This was, we were told, to tighten government spending to help with a ten year tax cut initiative proposed by the new Bush administration.

The FBI Buffalo Field Office

The morning of 9/11 started off as a beautiful WNY summer morning. I arrived in the office around 7:30 am for final discussions and briefings for a scheduled 9 a.m. meeting with Buffalo Police Commissioner Rocco Diina and his commanding officers. There had been tension between the FBI and the Buffalo Police Department for the past two years over corruption investigations. Six weeks before, in July 2001, the investigations culminated with the arrest of six BPD officers on drug and racketeering charges. The covert investigation was over but there were remaining perceptions that Commissioner Diina and I had discussed in our one-on-one meetings. As a result I had agreed to meet with any and all of his executives to go over specifics of the investigation and tell them the case was over and no more covert FBI operations were ongoing. Our investigation had shown there was no systemic corruption in the BPD rank and file, but rumors abounded that, for example, the FBI had 40 FBI undercover operatives throughout the city targeting corruption in the BPD. Totally false, there never had been, just one FBI source that successfully helped the FBI uncover the drug trafficking protection ring.

That morning, I drove to the meeting with my ASAC Stan Borgia and Chief Division Counsel Paul Moskal. As we were parking by the BPD, a radio report came across the radio show saying that a plane may have crashed into the World Trade Center. Noting the clear skies, I was surprised and the initial report I heard said it was a small plane. I recalled immediately a history note of a B-25 bomber flying into the Empire State Building in 1945 on a foggy morning, nothing at all like weather-wise I was seeing that morning. We thought nothing special at that point. We arrived at the meeting, I sat down, began introductions as my pager and phone were going off, which I silenced. I noted ASAC Borgia took a call and then walked to the Commissioner's TV to turn it on. At that moment in time, I realized things as we knew it would change forever. I immediately ended the meeting and directly returned to my office. The ten minute drive seemed like hours, listening to the car radio the confusion was obvious and heard another plane had gone into the WTC.

Arriving at the Buffalo FBI office, I went directly to my office. The staff were moving quickly, a lot of activity going on, and it was obvious they had already initiated our crisis management plan. Way ahead of me for sure and that is always a good thing for a leader. Managed chaos everywhere, but calm, collected and all business every place I turned. I was directed to an area of the office that was our crisis command center. It is the large training area of the office that turns into the center when needed. The center was already organized according to the crisis management plan every FBI office is familiar with and drills once a year in addition to actual crisis events. Charts, timelines, active leads assigned, liaison section for calls from our law enforcement partners and information we were gathering on events occurring. First directives I issued related to my immediate concerns. I needed an immediate accounting for all FBI employees of the division. Where were they, if on vacation contact had to be made, if at FBI training somewhere outside the division find them and assure me all were accounted for and safe. My SWAT team had been on training in Ohio and was already en route back to Buffalo. Anyone out “on the street” conducting FBI business was immediately recalled to the office. I ordered, according to our crisis plan, deployment of our forward command center to our emergency relocation area and prepare in event of need to evacuate our building. We did not know if there would be other attacks and our building was on a list of sites that would possibly be attacked. By whom we did not know, but we were not waiting to find out. Employees with no direct assignments were streaming into the crisis area to watch and look for answers. It was clear I needed to address the office. Fifteen minutes later, all hands in the building met. They were expecting leadership, answers and direction. I did not know what to say, how to say it, emotions were running deep. But, as the room quieted, I did what needed to be done. In the crowd I could read the emotions. Fear, anger, confusion, worry and shock. I know they saw all of that in me. I addressed the group, short and sweet. Did they see that in me? I told them I did not have facts at this time, FBIHQ was having an All-SAC conference call at 10 a.m. with the new FBI Director, Robert Mueller and the Counter Terrorism leadership. After the initial call with them, we were told conference calls would continue hourly until further notice. It was clear we needed to be ready for anything, and we needed to be up to the task. We should expect long hours, and security was the number one priority for the moment. It was clear we had been attacked and we should be ready for anything, even deployment to other areas of the state and country if needed. I told them to make sure their families were ok, reassure them if you can and be ready to respond if needed.

One of the first of many issues came to my attention. We had received information that a plane had crashed in the Southern Tier of WNY. We had no reliable information but just that a plane of some type may be down. I directed my evidence response team (ERT) to activate as we tried to determine validity. After about 15 minutes, we found out it was Flight 93 that flew into the ground at Shanksville, PA. I then contacted SAC Ken McCabe, FBI Pittsburgh who verified the incident and I offered FBI Buffalo ERT teams to assist if needed. Eventually, Buffalo ERT would respond to NY City. Our ERT team was one of the best, having experience as first responders to the USS Cole bombing and played a major role later in the Buffalo crash of Colgen Air Flight 3407.

The first FBIHQ conference call was now pushed off to 1030. As I was connected to the call the tone was somber. A roll call began of offices and SACs. Each and every SAC responded and you could hear the sadness. Then, for the first time, Director Robert Mueller spoke. I had met Director Mueller a few times at FBIHQ when he was the Deputy AG and chaired 2 FBI Criminal Division meetings I attended as a Senior Executive. As you recall, he had just become the FBI Director in the first week of September 2001. As he spoke, you could hear his leadership in crisis. The briefings began. Atta, Hanjour, Jarrah, Mihdar, Hazmi. Sitting there it was clear that issues I had to deal with were minor compared to the SACs of NY City, Boston, Washington Field Office, Baltimore, Miami, San Diego, Pittsburgh and FBIHQ. Within two hours of the attack, we identified most of the hijackers, where they came from, where they lived and on and on. What was clear was the FBI, intelligence community and other government agencies involved in international terrorism had not prevented the attack. It was immediately clear from the first call and subsequent calls, the FBI had pulled in incredible information and the investigation was underway and would continue for many years to come. How did the FBI, the intelligence community and others miss the signals, intelligence and eventually “connect the dots.” That would be debated for years to come and is still to this day. That in and of itself led to arguably the biggest transformation of the priority mission of any government agency: prevent another terrorist attack. PENTTBOMB (Pentagon/Twin Tower Bombing) became the official code name for the investigation. All in all the Buffalo Division over the next 60 days would cover over 4,000 investigative leads, operate a command center for 24/7, deal with the realization one of our Agents lost an immediate relative in the WTC, deal with a second threat from Anthrax, snipers carrying out an extortion attack for weeks and six months later an FBI analyst assigned to the CIA would discover one of the names key to our Lackawanna Six case was a card-carrying member of al-Qaeda. This would put Buffalo right in the center of the war on terror.

The day never ended. Leads were already coming in and we were responding. I had our SWAT team deploy to our building perimeter and had our surveillance team start to conduct counter-surveillance around the radius of our building looking for any signs we were being watched, photographed or anything suspicious. Calls were coming in from many law enforcement agencies, concerned public officials and even retired FBI Agents asking to help. We actually had two FBI Agents on vacation visiting in Buffalo come down to the office to help. Calls from the public flooded our switchboard and command post. As an afterthought, I was asked by Erie County Commissioner Joel Giambra to attend his security and law enforcement meeting. Initially we were not invited but BPD Commissioner Diina insisted Giambra ask me to attend. I did, provided a detailed briefing of what I knew, reassured that we had no direct information Buffalo or anywhere else in WNY was a target. He then had a press conference attended by his personnel, BPD Commissioner Diina and other politicians. I was asked to address the media. As I took to the podium, I saw the same look on the faces of the masses of reporters, county employees and the public that I saw in the faces of my FBI Buffalo personnel when I addressed them.

I felt helpless for most of the rest of the day. The work that needed to be done was being done flawlessly by the FBI Buffalo employees. I took hourly briefings on operations, had at least three more FBIHQ conference calls that day. I started to send employees home to rest since many would start shifts at midnight. We would go around the clock for the next three months. I left the office around 1:30 a.m. of now 9/12, got to bed around 2:30 and was up at 5:00 a.m. ready to begin another day of what I had no idea. In the shower that morning it was the first time to really reflect on the events of the day. It was very difficult to put up a strong front. The loss of life, the anger, the fear, the emotions, yes the emotions. I was overcome with emotion and not ashamed to admit I shed more than a few tears in the solace of my condo. But, like we are expected to do, you pick yourself up, dust yourself off and go back for more. I needed coffee and to make matters worse, the coffee shop at my favorite Wegmans, where I was a regular customer at the coffee shop had no coffee made yet. I felt I was going to lose it again if it were not for the wonderful employee there at 5:45 a.m. who looked at me, saw the look in my eyes and came up and just hugged me. Some people just know and nothing had to be said. She made me my own cup of coffee. For the first time in the last 24 hours I felt we would get through this tragedy and be better for it.

25 years have passed and the FBI is a different organization, much for the better. Through all the controversy of not preventing 9/11, changing how the FBI focuses on terrorism and the collection, use of and sharing intelligence has been extremely positive. It launched a new generation of FBI. The oversight of the FBI since then has been controversial, demanding, misunderstood and far from over. But what is needed is the oversight, the questioning of tactics, the need to make sure the FBI remains focused on its mission and priorities while respecting the rights of every person in the U.S. I have always said the FBI is not a perfect organization, no organization is, but it is pretty damn close.