Cosa sapeva la CIA prima dell'11/9: il summit del terrore di Kuala Lumpur

di Hammer

Tra il 5 e l'8 gennaio del 2000 si svolse a Kuala Lumpur, capitale della Malesia, un incontro di alcuni membri di al-Qaeda allo scopo di organizzare i principali attacchi terroristici che avrebbero condotto negli anni successivi. L'incontro è noto come il summit del terrore.

L'incontro fu organizzato da Riduan Isamuddin, noto con il nome di battaglia Hambali, nella casa malese del microbiologo Yazid Sufaat; entrambi gli uomini erano affiliati al gruppo terroristico del sudest asiatico Jemaah Islamiyah, legato ad al-Qaeda e ai Talebani. L'appartamento in cui si svolse l'incontro è nel quartiere di Bandar Sungai Long (foto sotto), complesso residenziale sorto attorno a un campo da golf nella citta di Kajang, a pochi chilometri da Kuala Lumpur; durante la sua detenzione a Guantanamo Hambali indicò il luogo con il nome di Song Gai Long.

Secondo quanto riportato dal 9/11 Commission Report, Hambali invitò all'incontro quattro membri di al-Qaeda che bin Laden aveva selezionato per condurre un attentato con l'uso di aeroplani: Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash (detto Khallad) e Abu Bara al-Yemeni. I primi due sarebbero poi stati tra i cinque dirottatori del volo American Airlines 77 che si schiantò sul Pentagono. Khallad e Abu Bara volarono a Kuala Lumpur a metà dicembre del 1999 da Karachi, in Pakistan; al-Hazmi li raggiunse una decina di giorni da Quetta, dove si spostò dopo essere stato a Karachi con gli altri due.

Sempre secondo il 9/11 Commission Report, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed disse in un'intervista agli inquirenti che ad al-Hazmi e al-Mihdhar fu indicato di usare i propri documenti yemeniti (il rapporto parla di yemeni documents, ma non specifica di quali documenti si tratti) per poi viaggiare verso gli USA con i passaporti sauditi, così da nascondere agli agenti di frontiera statunitensi di essere stati in Pakistan poco prima.

Il primo scopo di Khallad nella capitale malese non era però partecipare al summit, ma condurre alcuni test sulla sicurezza aerea. Il 31 dicembre infatti volò a Bangkok e il giorno seguente si spostò a Hong Kong con un volo di linea americano; prese in biglietto di prima classe, sperando di poter vedere l'interno della cabina di pilotaggio, ma dal sedile che gli fu assegnato non riuscì nel suo intento. Inoltre Khallad portò nel proprio bagaglio a mano un tagliacarte all'interno di una busta con i propri oggetti da toeletta. Il giorno seguente tornò a Bangkok da Hong Kong e ai controlli di sicurezza all'imbarco i controllori verificarono il suo bagaglio a mano e controllarono anche la busta con il tagliacarte, ma diedero un'occhiata generale e lo lasciarono passare. Sul volo Khallad attese che gli altri in prima classe si addormentassero, quindi tirò fuori la busta e nessun assistente di volo fece alcuna obiezione.

Da Bangkok Khallad tornò a Kuala Lumpur, dove il 5 gennaio arrivò anche al-Mihdhar. Durante l'incontro, che durò quattro giorni, i quattro discussero della pianificazione di alcuni degli attentati più importanti che al-Qaeda avrebbe condotto nei mesi successivi, come l'attacco alla USS Cole e quelli che si sarebbero svolto l'11 settembre del 2001. I partecipanti discussero anche alcuni scenari che poi non si concretizzarono, come il prendere in ostaggio i passeggeri dei voli dirottati.

In quel periodo la CIA seguiva già i due dirottatori, che avevano i visti per entrare negli USA, e continuò a sorvegliarli durante i quattro giorni del summit. I due furono anche fotografati dalla CIA, anche con il supporto delle autorità malesi. La CIA era anche informata del fatto che al-Mihdhar e al-Hazmi avevano visti per entrare negli USA, ma non ne informò l'INS, che avrebbe potuto bloccarli all'ingresso, né ne informò l'FBI, che avrebbe potuto seguirli negli USA così da capire le loro intenzioni. La CIA chiese all'INS solo il 21 agosto del 2001 di controllare se i due sospetti volessero entrare negli USA, ma ottenne come risposta che erano già entrati. A quel punto l'agenzia chiese all'FBI di cercarli, ma il tempo non fu sufficiente.

Purtroppo tutto sembra indicare che la CIA sottovalutò la minaccia rappresentata dai due terroristi che avevano visti per entrare negli USA e se avesse agito in anticipo è probabile che l’11/9 sarebbe stato evitato.

Chi è Omar al-Bayoumi

di Hammer

Le 28 pagine del Joint Inquiry pubblicate a luglio del 2016, dopo essere rimaste secretate per 14 anni, hanno attirato l’attenzione sulla figura di Omar al-Bayoumi, il saudita che offrì aiuto logistico e finanziario ai dirottatori al-Mihdhar e al-Hazmi durante la loro permanenza in California.

Il testo delle 28 pagine lascia aperta la questione se al-Bayoumi sia o meno un agente dell'intelligence saudita e questo punto è ovviamente di fondamentale importanza. L’ambasciata saudita negli Stati Uniti ha smentito più volte (il 23 luglio, il 2 agosto e il 13 settembre del 2003) che al-Bayoumi fosse uno dei propri agenti e in un’intervista rilasciata alla 9/11 Commission nell’ottobre del 2003 a Riyadh lo stesso al-Bayoumi dichiarò di essere molto ferito nel venire descritto come una spia saudita.

Tuttavia il 10 aprile di quest’anno il senatore della Florida Bob Graham ha asserito nel corso della trasmissione televisiva 60 Minutes (in una puntata dedicata alle 28 pagine), in onda sulla CBS, che al-Bayoumi era noto all’FBI come un agente saudita anche prima dell’11/9. Lo stesso sospetto era diffuso nella comunità islamica di San Diego, come confermato da alcune testimonianze raccolte dal San Diego Magazine.

L’uomo nacque in Arabia Saudita e secondo il 9/11 Commission Report aveva 42 anni nel 2000, quindi la data di nascita risale al 1957 o al 1958. Secondo le 28 pagine, al-Bayoumi lavorò per la Saudi Civil Aviation Administration dal 1976 al 1993. Il settimanale San Diego Reader, nel luglio di quest’anno, ha dedicato un lungo articolo (che cita molte e autorevoli fonti) a chiarire chi fosse al-Bayoumi; secondo l’articolo in questione, l’uomo si sarebbe trasferito negli USA nel 1994 per studiare inglese alla San Diego State University.

Dalle 28 pagine apprendiamo che al-Bayoumi, durante la sua permanenza negli USA, veniva stipendiato da una compagnia saudita con sede negli Stati Uniti, presso i cui uffici però si recava molto di rado; inoltre la moglie di al-Bayoumi, chiamata Manal Bajadr, riceveva regolarmente sovvenzioni dalla famiglia reale e dall’ambasciata saudita negli USA. I due avevano anche quattro figli, che vivevano con loro a San Diego.

Secondo l’articolo del San Diego Reader, il primo incontro tra al-Bayoumi e i due dirottatori avvenne l’1 febbraio del 2000 al ristorante Mediterranean Gourmet, sul Venice Boulevard a Los Angeles, dopo che al-Bayoumi si era recato al consolato saudita nella medesima città. L’uomo avvicinò i due terroristi fingendo di far cadere un giornale accanto a loro, quindi si presentò e intavolò una discussione da cui scoprì che i due non si trovavano bene a Los Angeles e li invitò quindi a trasferirsi a San Diego.

Pochi giorni dopo al-Bayoumi li aiutò a trovare un alloggio presso i Parkwood Apartments (immagine sotto) di San Diego, nel quale viveva lo stesso al-Bayoumi, e questi li aiutò anche a pagare le prime rate dell’affitto anticipando il denaro con un assegno circolare poiché la proprietà della casa non accettò il pagamento in contanti dei due uomini che non avevano un conto corrente negli USA. Secondo le 28 pagine i due dirottatori trascorsero anche qualche giorno nell’appartamento di al-Bayoumi prima di affittarne uno nello stesso complesso.

Dopo pochi giorni al-Bayoumi organizzò anche per loro una festa di benvenuto al Centro Islamico di San Diego. I due dirottatori rimasero ai Parkwood Apartments fino a maggio del 2000, quando si trasferirono a casa di Abdussattar Shaikh, informatore dell’FBI, a Lemon Groove. Gli inquirenti non seppero che i dirottatori vissero a casa di un informatore dell’FBI fin dopo gli attacchi. In un’intervista alla 9/11 Commission anche Shaikh confermò di aver sentito, anche da al-Hazmi, che al-Bayoumi fosse un agente dell’intelligence saudita. L’uomo lo aveva forse appreso dalla comunità islamica locale, all’interno della quale molti credevano appunto che al-Bayoumi fosse una spia.

Il racconto di al-Bayoumi sulla sua frequentazione con i due terroristi alla 9/11 Commission fu comunque notevolmente diverso. Raccontò infatti di avere conosciuto i due terroristi al ristorante in modo del tutto fortuito, dopo essersi alzato dal proprio tavolo per prendere qualcosa in un frigorifero e aver sentito i due seduti poco lontano parlare in arabo tra loro. A quel punto si avvicinò loro per presentarsi. Al-Bayoumi raccontò quindi di averli incontrati una seconda volta alla moschea di San Diego dopo che i due avevano chiesto di lui all’imam. Inoltre asserì che i due dirottatori vissero vicino a casa sua solo per pochi giorni in quanto durante un suo viaggio di lavoro a Washington si sarebbero trasferiti a El Cajon dove i prezzi di affitto erano più bassi.

Nel luglio del 2001 al-Bayoumi si trasferì in Inghilterra, nell’area di Birmingham, per conseguire un dottorato di ricerca alla Aston University. Nel settembre del 2001, dopo gli attentati dell’11/9, al-Bayoumi fu arrestato da Scotland Yard su richiesta dell’FBI ma fu rilasciato dopo poco tempo, perché le indagini giunsero alla conclusione che al-Bayoumi non avesse legami con al-Qaeda e non fosse un complice degli attentatori, ma solo una persona che aveva interagito con loro negli USA. Dopo essere stato rilasciato, al-Bayoumi riprese gli studi presso la Aston University per poi tornare stabilmente in Arabia Saudita, dove vive tuttora.

Se, come sembra probabile, al-Bayoumi era davvero un agente dell’intelligence saudita, resta da spiegare il suo interesse verso i due dirottatori. Una delle ipotesi è che l’uomo volesse arruolarli come informatori, o solo indagare su di loro; in questo caso appare drammaticamente palese che l’11/9 sarebbe stato evitabile se l’intelligence saudita che seguiva i due terroristi non avesse sottovalutato la minaccia che questi rappresentavano.

La presunta detenzione in Israele di Mohamed Atta

di Hammer

Nei giorni successivi all’11/9 si diffuse su alcuni media la notizia secondo cui Mohamed Atta sarebbe stato un terrorista già noto da tempo alle autorità americane e israeliane in quanto reo di un attentato contro un autobus in Cisgiordania nel 1986. Ne diedero notizia, tra gli altri, il Boston Globe il 13 settembre 2001 e il San Francisco Chronicle il 16 settembre 2001. Secondo quanto riportato sarebbe quindi incomprensibile come un noto terrorista possa essere entrato negli USA, averci vissuto liberamente e aver preso un aereo di linea.

L'attentato a cui tali articoli fanno riferimento fu perpetrato il 12 aprile del 1986 da un uomo di 33 anni chiamato Mahmoud Mahmoud Atta, che lanciò una bomba contro un autobus della compagnia israeliana Egged e poi, insieme a un complice chiamato Salah Hariz, sparò contro il mezzo con degli Uzi dopo che l'autobus si era fermato. Nell'attentato l'autista perse la vita e tre passeggeri rimasero gravemente feriti.

Secondo quanto riportato dal volume The Terrorist List: The Middle East di Edward F. Mickolus, Atta, nato in Giordania ma in possesso anche di cittadinanza statunitense, fu catturato in Venezuela nel maggio del 1987 e trasferito negli USA, dove fu arrestato dall'FBI, quindi fu estradato nel 1990 dagli USA verso Israele, dove fu condannato all'ergastolo.

In realtà il Mohamed Atta che pilotò il volò American Airlines 11 contro la Torre Nord del World Trade Center non ha alcun legame con Mahmoud Mahmoud Atta: si tratta solo di un caso di quasi omonimia, che in seguito all'11/9 generò confusione. La smentita che si trattasse della stessa persona fu pubblicata da varie testate, tra cui il Jerusalem Post il 7 novembre del 2001. Il Post specificò che tra i due Atta c'era un notevole differenza di età, che Mahmoud Mahmoud Atta era nativo della Palestina (e non della Giordania come riportato dal libro di Mickolus) mentre il dirottatore era egiziano, che l’uomo fu liberato dopo la condanna dalla Corte Suprema per irregolarità del processo di estradizione, e in ultimo che non era noto dove l'Atta che attaccò l'autobus si trovasse nel 2001 e se fosse ancora vivo. Anche il Boston Globe pubblicò il 19 settembre del 2001 la smentita del fatto che i due Atta fossero la stessa persona. Inoltre dell'arresto di Mahmoud Mahmoud Atta a New York esiste una foto del celebre fotografo Allan Tannenbaum, da cui si vede chiaramente che l'uomo è ben diverso dal dirottatore Mohamed Atta.

Un equivoco di questo tipo, e se ne verificarono molti altri durante l'identificazione dei 19 dirottatori dell’11/9, dimostra anche a chi sostiene che questi siano ancora vivi che in realtà le omonimie esistono e a volte possono portare a errori clamorosi, e che talvolta si verificano anche coincidenze all'apparenza improbabili, come il fatto che due omonimi possano essere entrambi terroristi.

Getting bin Laden, il primo racconto della missione che uccise Osama

di Hammer

Prima della pubblicazione del libro No Easy Day di Matt Bissonnette (con lo pseudonimo di Marc Owen) e prima che Rob O'Neill raccontasse la propria versione dei fatti a The Esquire (celandosi dietro al nome The Shooter), fu pubblicato un primo e meno noto racconto della missione che uccise Osama bin Laden. L'8 agosto del 2011, a soli tre mesi dal raid di Abbottabad, il giornalista Nicholas Schmidle pubblicò sul New Yorker un lungo articolo intitolato Getting bin Laden, in cui descrisse in modo molto dettagliato come la missione era stata compiuta. L’articolo fu pubblicato anche prima del contestato volume SEAL Target Geronimo di Chuck Pfarrer, le cui lacune ed evidenti imprecisioni sono state evidenziate sia dall'American Thinker sia dal giornalista della CNN Peter Bergen.

Schmidle inizia la propria ricostruzione dal 2009, anno dell’insediamento di Barack Obama, che volle spingere di nuovo sulla ricerca del terrorista saudita dopo che la pista si era raffreddata sotto la presidenza di George W. Bush. L'anno seguente la CIA individuò uno dei corrieri di Osama che si spostava frequentemente verso un compound di Abbottabad i cui abitanti bruciavano i rifiuti all'interno delle mura anziché depositarli per la raccolta; inoltre all'interno della struttura abitava un uomo che non usciva mai dal recinto esterno. Dopo essere giunti, con un'azione di intelligence, alla ragionevole certezza che l'uomo che non usciva era proprio Osama bin Laden, Obama chiese alla CIA di predisporre alcuni piani per un raid nel compound.

Una delle prime ipotesi considerate fu di scavare un tunnel ed entrare da sottoterra, ma fu scartata perché il compound sorgeva su un bacino di ritenzione. Gli scenari proposti a Obama prevedevano quindi un bombardamento aereo o un raid con elicotteri. Il Presidente scelse la seconda opzione e incaricò l'ammiraglio McRaven di definirne i dettagli.

Vennero scelti per l'operazione 23 uomini del Red Squadron del SEAL Team 6; il gruppo condusse una settimana di esercitazioni nel North Carolina dal 10 aprile e una seconda settimana in Nevada a partire dal 18 aprile. Il piano prevedeva di trasportare gli uomini con due elicotteri Black Hawk, il primo dei quali avrebbe fatto scendere i 12 SEAL che trasportava al suolo vicino al compound, mentre il secondo elicottero avrebbe fatto scendere quattro SEAL, insieme al traduttore (che l'autore cela sotto lo pseudonimo di Ahmed), all'angolo nord orientale del compound affinché controllassero il perimetro per poi portare i restanti sette militari sul tetto della struttura. Il team partì il 26 aprile dagli Stati Uniti per arrivare dopo alcuni scali a Jalalabad due giorni dopo.

La notte tra l'1 e il 2 maggio del 2011 la missione non iniziò come previsto e i primi problemi si verificarono appena giunti al compound. Il primo elicottero, infatti, perse il controllo e atterrò in una situazione di emergenza, riportando gravi danni. Il pilota fece schiantare intenzionalmente il velivolo di muso in un recinto per animali all'interno delle mura esterne del compound per evitare che l’elicottero si rovesciasse su un lato. Non sapendo cosa fosse successo al primo Black Hawk, anche il secondo cambiò i propri piani e abbandonò l'idea di far scendere alcuni uomini sul tetto, atterrando invece sul terreno all'esterno delle mura.

Nonostante l'avvio problematico, il gruppo decise di continuare la missione; Schmidle descrive dettagliatamente i movimenti di ciascun gruppo di SEAL all'interno del complesso e dell'edificio fino a quando tre dei militari salirono al piano superiore, dove colpirono a morte il fondatore di al-Qaeda. I SEAL annunciarono quindi via radio al Presidente di aver ucciso "Geronimo", come era chiamato in codice il terrorista saudita.

Prima di riportare il cadavere in Afghanistan, i militari dovettero distruggere i resti dell'elicottero danneggiato: dapprima con mani e martelli e poi con dell'esplosivo. Un Chinook arrivò a prelevare il corpo di bin Laden e venne usato anche per trasportare alcuni SEAL in sostituzione dell'elicottero andato distrutto. Dal cadavere vennero estratti campioni di midollo osseo che furono trasportati sul Black Hawk in modo che viaggiasse su un mezzo diverso rispetto al corpo. Il cadavere fu quindi portato a Jalalabad, dove per verificare che l'altezza corrispondesse a quella stimata fu fatto sdraiare un SEAL di un metro e ottanta accanto al corpo del terrorista morto in modo da valutarne la differenza.

Il corpo di Osama fu quindi lavato, avvolto in una veste bianca e deposto nell'Oceano Indiano. La morte di bin Laden fu un grande successo politico e militare per la Casa Bianca e pochi giorni dopo anche al-Qaeda confermò il decesso del proprio leader.

Nonostante sia molto ricco di dettagli che si sono nel tempo rivelati corretti, l'articolo di Schimdle fu criticato dal giornalista Craig Silverman e da Adam Clark Estes, che contestarono che Schimdle non ebbe accesso ai racconti diretti dei militari che compirono la missione per scrivere il proprio pezzo. Tuttavia sia Schindle sia l'editore David Remnick ribatterono che l'autore aveva consultato fonti vicine al commando che aveva condotto le operazioni e che le informazioni riportate erano state adeguatamente verificate, nonostante effettivamente l'autore non citi le proprie fonti. Del resto, il lungo articolo di Schindle è citato come fonte anche dai migliori libri sulla missione che uccise Osama bin Laden, quali Manhunt di Peter Bergen e The Finish di Marc Bowden, e tuttora costituisce una delle migliori e più ricche fonti di informazioni per conoscere quanto accaduto quella notte ad Abbottabad.

Giulietto Chiesa e i 500.000 euro raccolti per “Zero”

di Paolo Attivissimo

Gli anni passano, i ricordi si affievoliscono e le tracce in Rete delle asserzioni dei complottisti sull’11/9 spariscono. Ma è importante crearne una memoria permanente, per evitare confusioni e per fare in modo che i complottisti non possano rifarsi una verginità e far finta di non aver mai detto o fatto certe cose.

Per esempio, sono scomparse da Internet molte delle pagine che documentavano le dichiarazioni di Giulietto Chiesa sul costo di produzione del suo documentario Zero del 2007, diretto da Franco Fracassi e Francesco Trento. Il sito Zerofilm.it scriveva, a ottobre 2007, che il “valore” del documentario era di 500.000 euro, ma questa dichiarazione è scomparsa: la pagina non esiste più. Tuttavia Archive.org ne conserva tuttora una copia della versione in inglese:

Nel 2008 Undicisettembre raccolse questa immagine della versione italiana, che dice che “Il 100% del film vale 500.000 €”:

Una dichiarazione analoga fu raccolta da Abitarearoma.net nel 2007:

Come DIVENTARE COPRODUTTORI e CONTRIBUIRE
– E’ possibile fare versamenti a fondo perduto, usando Paypal e la carta di credito.
– E’ possibile diventare COPRODUTTORI a tutti gli effetti, versando 500 euro o multipli di 500 euro.
– E’ possibile acquistare percentuali di quote, investendo minimo 100 euro; 
Nel dettaglio:
1 – Il 100% del film vale 500.000 €. Tale ammontare è suddiviso in 1.000 quote da 500 €, che corrispondono ognuna allo 0,1% del totale. Per partecipare alla produzione, essere COPRODUTTORI, bisogna versare almeno 500 € o multipli di 500 €. I coproduttori partecipano ai guadagni complessivi del film in proporzione alla percentuale acquistata.
2 – Chi investe tra i 100 e i 500 euro acquisterà una percentuale di quota (ad es. 100 euro sono il 20% di una quota)
3 – Chiunque verserà meno di 100 euro lo farà a titolo di donazione a fondo perduto.

Per partecipare si può scrivere a: coproduzione@zerofilm.it
Tutte le info su www.zerofilm.it

Oggi il sito Zerofilm.it non esiste più. Questo sembra indicare che alcuni paladini italiani della lotta per la verità fatichino persino a mantenere aperto un sito Web, ora che le occasioni di sfruttamento economico sono svanite nel dimenticatoio.

In compenso esiste ancora un sito francese, Reopen911.info, che parla di Zero in questi termini (copia archiviata anche su Archive.is; screenshot qui accanto):

En tout, le film a coûté 500.000 Euros, dont 200.000 par l’actionnariat populaire, et le reste du financement est venu de nos propres disponibilités et aussi de notre travail et de notre expertise et de celle de Francesco.

Lo stesso sito aggiunge un altro dato interessante:

Il aurait pu coûter 100.000 de moins sans ce système d’actionnariat, car on ne peut pas négocier les prix et demander des rabais à quelqu’un de rémunéré par ce système d’actions. A ce jour, les gains n’ont toujours pas remboursé le budget du film.

World Trade Center: an interview with survivor Krista Salvatore

by Hammer. An Italian translation is available here.

Fifteen years have now passed since September 11, 2001 and Undicisettembre continues its effort to preserve the memories of that fateful day.

On this anniversary we submit to our readers the account of survivor Krista Salvatore, who was in the South Tower during the attacks and experienced personally the dramatic events of 9/11 in New York.

We wish to thank Krista Salvatore for her kindness and willingness to share her experience.

Undicisettembre: Can you give us a full account of what you saw and experienced on 9/11?

Krista Salvatore: On 9/11 I was working in New York, I had just graduated from college, I was working for Morgan Stanley, it was my second day in New York. I was living in Florida but they sent me there for a three week training program; my office was on the 61st floor of World Trade Center 2. I went to work on my second day just as any regular day. During my training there was a very loud crash or boom and all the windows of my training room all exploded; we didn't know what was happening but they told us our building was secure and that a small plane, like a Cessna, hit Tower 1 and that we should have stayed in our offices because Tower 2 was secure. It kept coming on the intercom speaker telling anyone in my building “Tower 2 is secure” but my instinct and everyone else I was with told me to get out. We knew something wasn't right and we headed for the exit.

The smell of jet fuel was really strong and when we looked outside the windows there was paper everywhere. It looked like someone had taken a trash out from the rooftop and threw paper everywhere, a lot of paper was on fire which was a really strange thing to see. So we started going down the stairs and when I was on the 41st floor my building was hit and from that point on the building never really stopped moving. Up to that point it wasn't chaotic, people were not panicking; but when the airplane hit my building it went really serious: at that moment we knew it wasn't a small plane and we knew it wasn't an accident. We had gotten bits and pieces of information along the way. It got really scary and people hurried as fast as possible, but it was totally organized, there was no chaos, but I literally didn't even have time to kick off my high heel shoes.

When we got to the bottom since there was so much debris on the ground they had us actually go through the World Trade Center underground mall till we got to the actual exit. At the exit there were Port Authority people directing us to go uptown and they were sending us that way. It was really sad and scary because we looked up and we could see people jumping, there were sirens everywhere, emergency people everywhere, we saw firefighter walking up the steps while we were going down.

I had been out for about ten minutes when my tower, Tower 2, collapsed. I was trying to call my parents all the way down, I kept redialing the number but there was no cellphone signal. I finally was able to talk to my parents at about noon that day. After my building collapsed they had come to the realization that I didn't make it and it had been very hard not being able to contact them, not being able to let them know that I was okay and they feared for the worst.

I was staying in a hotel in midtown so it was pretty far away but when I got out of the World Trade Center I continued running with the group of people I was with. We got far away enough so that we were not in the cloud of smoke and debris when Tower 2 collapsed. So I got back to my hotel before I completely knew what had happened. People were stopping on the street and telling us what was going on. There were emergency vehicles and fighter jets flying above.

I don't even know how to describe it, it was pretty surreal to see fighter jets flying around Manhattan, it was like a war zone. I remember the scariest thing was that you didn't know what was going to happen next, I never truly felt safe until I got out of New York. The next day I packed all my stuff and went to the hotel lobby and asked them to call me a cab because I wanted to go to the airport. They told me “The airport is closed. You are not going to get out for a little while” I said “No, I'll wait there.” and they convinced me I wasn't going to be able to take a flight. So my dad drove from Saint Louis where he lived to New York to come and get me because I had no way to get home, I couldn't get a rental car, the subway had stopped, there was no way out of the island. So my dad was able to come and get me and bring me home.


Undicisettembre: So you did not see Tower 1 collapse?

Krista Salvatore: No, I didn't see it collapse because I was far enough away that I could not actually see it but we heard it and everyone understood what was happening.

Undicisettembre: How long did it take you to get back to normalcy after 9/11?

Krista Salvatore: A really long time, it was tough. I lived in Florida at the time and I wasn't with a group of people where I could have a support system or other people who had gone through the same thing. When I got back to Florida everyone was treating we differently like I was the girl from the World Trade Center, everyone looked at me and they kind of tiptoed around me and I felt like the treated me differently. And I had a lot of guilt, that was the hardest part for me. I had a lot of guilt. I was 22, single, I had no family, I didn't have people who relied on me; it was hard for me that so many people who didn't make it out of there alive had kids and family members that they supported. It was hard for me to hear people say everything happened for a reason there were many people in the upper floors who didn't make and it made no sense to me.


Undicisettembre: What are your thought about the firefighters who went into the Towers risking their own lives to save others?

Krista Salvatore: They are absolute heroes! There are no other ways to describe them, they knew while going in that they were not going to make it out. When my building was hit there were so many firefighters going up, they were doing all that they could to save lives and they were giving their own for that.


Undicisettembre: Did you suffer from Post Traumatic Stress?

Krista Salvatore: I did. I went to see a counselor for a little while, I was depressed which was hard because people expected me to be grateful that I was okay but I was depressed because I had a lot of guilt.

It took me a good year to get back to myself, I still think about it everyday. I think that now I'm grateful that I have kids and a legacy. I still think about it. Some days when I see certain things it's harder than others, but again it took me a good year to really get back to myself.


Undicisettembre: How does 9/11 affect your everyday life?

Krista Salvatore: I really try to be grateful for little things and not to stress over little things and realize there are people out there fighting to make sure this doesn't happen to us again, that there's never an attack on the US soil again. There are soldiers that are deployed and they are fighting terrorism and I try to be appreciative of that.

Every 9/11 I do a walk with a group of people here in Saint Louis, we walk 21 miles to the Arch [picture on the right shows Salvatore at the 2015 march with her father], which is a monument we have here in Saint Louis, and we all carry flags. We are from 600 to a thousand people and we remember people who died on that day and people who are fighting for us. There are a lot of firefighters and military members who do the walk with us.


Undicisettembre: Have you been to Ground Zero after 9/11?

Krista Salvatore: I went one time in 2003. It was really, really hard. It was very sad.

I really want to go again. When I went it was a construction zone, so it was sad.


Undicisettembre: What do you think about conspiracy theories that claim that 9/11 is an inside job?

Krista Salvatore: I think it's completely bogus. There's no fact to support that.


Undicisettembre: Do you think the nation is still living in fear or has it regained its standing in the World?

Krista Salvatore: I don't think we live in fear, but to be honest it scares me a little bit because I fear we are getting a little complacent. After 9/11 we were on very high alert and we did live in fear for a little while, everyone was supersensitive that anything can potentially be a threat and now we became complacent and it makes me a little bit scared that something like that can happen again.

World Trade Center: intervista con la sopravvissuta Krista Salvatore

di Hammer. L'originale inglese è disponibile qui.

Sono passati quindici anni dall'11 settembre 2001 e Undicisettembre continua nel suo sforzo per evitare che si perda la memoria di quanto accaduto quel giorno.

In occasione di questo anniversario offriamo ai nostri lettori la testimonianza della sopravvissuta Krista Salvatore, che si trovava nella Torre Sud durante gli attacchi e che ha vissuto personalmente il dramma di quelle ore.

Ringraziamo Krista Salvatore per la sua cortesia e disponibilità.

Undicisettembre: Ci puoi fare un racconto di ciò che hai visto e vissuto l’11/9?

Krista Salvatore: L’11/9 lavoravo a New York, mi ero appena laureata al college, lavoravo per la Morgan Stanley, era il mio secondo giorno a New York. Abitavo in Florida ma mi avevano mandato lì per una programma di formazione di tre settimane; il mio ufficio era al sessantunesimo piano del World Trade Center 2. Andai al lavoro il mio secondo giorno come in un giorno normale. Durante la mia sessione di formazione ci fu uno schianto molto forte o un’esplosione e tutte le finestre della mia aula di formazione esplosero; non sapevamo cosa stesse succedendo ma ci dissero che il nostro edificio era al sicuro e che un piccolo aereo, forse un Cessna, aveva colpito la Torre 1 e che noi avremmo dovuto rimanere nei nostri uffici perché la Torre 2 era al sicuro. Continuava a essere trasmesso dall’interfono il messaggio che diceva a tutti nel mio palazzo “La torre 2 è al sicuro” ma il mio istinto e tutte le altre persone che erano con me mi dissero di uscire. Sapevamo che c'era qualcosa che non andava e ci dirigemmo verso l'uscita.

L'odore del carburante avio era molto forte e quando guardammo fuori dalle finestre c’era carta ovunque. Sembrava che qualcuno avesse vuotato un cestino della carta dal tetto e avesse gettato carta ovunque, molta della carta era in fiamme, e questa era una cosa molto strana da vedere. Iniziammo a scendere le scale e quando ero al quarantunesimo piano il mio palazzo fu colpito e da quel momento non smise mai di oscillare. Fino a quel punto non era caotico, la gente non era nel panico; ma quando l'aereo colpì il mio palazzo la situazione divenne veramente seria: in quel momento capimmo che non era un piccolo aereo e che non era un incidente. Avevamo ricevuto piccoli pezzi di informazione mentre scendevamo. Fu veramente spaventoso e la gente iniziò a correre più in fretta possibile, ma era tutto molto organizzato, non c'era caos, ma io letteralmente non ebbi nemmeno il tempo di togliermi le scarpe coi tacchi.

Quando arrivammo giù c'erano così tante macerie a terra che ci fecero uscire dal centro commerciale sotterraneo sotto il World Trade Center finché non arrivammo a un’uscita vera e propria. All'uscita c'era personale della Port Authority che ci dirigeva verso uptown e ci mandava in quella direzione. Fu veramente triste e spaventoso perché guardammo in alto e vedemmo le persone che saltavano giù, c'erano sirene ovunque, personale di emergenza ovunque, vedemmo pompieri salire le scale mentre noi scendevamo.

Ero uscita da circa 10 minuti quando la mia torre, la Torre 2, crollò. Avevo tentato di chiamare i miei genitori durante tutta la discesa, continuai a digitare il numero ma i cellulari non avevano rete. Finalmente riuscii a parlare con i miei genitori intorno a mezzogiorno. Dopo che il mio palazzo era crollato erano giunti alla conclusione che io non fossi riuscita ad uscirne e fu molto difficile non poter parlare con loro, non poter far sapere loro che stavo bene perché loro temettero il peggio.

Stavo in un hotel a midtown, che quindi era abbastanza lontano, ma quando uscii dal World Trade Center continuai a correre insieme al gruppo di persone che era con me. Arrivammo sufficientemente lontano da non trovarci nella nuvola di polvere e detriti quando la Torre 2 crollò. Quindi arrivai in hotel prima di aver saputo completamente ciò che era successo. Le persone si fermavano per strada e ci dicevano ciò che succedeva. C’erano veicoli di emergenza e i caccia volavano sopra di noi.

Non so nemmeno come descriverlo, era piuttosto surreale vedere i caccia volare sopra Manhattan, era come una zona di guerra. Ricordo che la cosa più spaventosa era che non sapevamo cosa sarebbe successo dopo, non mi sentii veramente al sicuro finché non lasciai New York. Il giorno seguente raccolsi tutte le mie cose e andai nella lobby dell'hotel e chiesi loro di chiamarmi un taxi perché volevo andare all'aeroporto. Mi dissero “L'aeroporto è chiuso. Per un po' non puoi andare da nessuna parte.” Dissi “No, aspetterò lì.” e mi convinsero che non avrei potuto prendere un volo. Quindi mio padre arrivò in macchina da Saint Louis, dove viveva, fino a New York per venire a prendermi perché non avevo modo di tornare a casa, non potevo prendere una macchina a noleggio, e la metropolitana non funzionava, non c'era modo di uscire dall'isola. Quindi mio padre mi venne a prendere e mi portò a casa.


Undicisettembre: Quindi non vedesti il crollo della Torre 1?

Krista Salvatore: No, non la vidi crollare perché ero abbastanza lontana da non poterla vedere, ma ne udimmo il crollo e tutti capirono cosa stava succedendo.

Undicisettembre: Quanto tempo ti ci volle prima di tornare alla normalità dopo l’11/9?

Krista Salvatore: Davvero mi ci volle molto tempo, fu molto difficile. Vivevo in Florida a quel tempo e non ero con un gruppo di persone con cui potessi avere un sistema di sostegno o altre persone che fossero passate attraverso la stessa esperienza. Quando tornai in Florida tutti mi trattavano in modo diverso, come se io fossi la ragazza dal World Trade Center, tutti mi guardavano e mi trattavano con circospezione e io sentivo che mi trattavano in modo diverso. Avevo un gran senso di colpa, questa fu la parte più difficile per me. Avevo un gran senso di colpa. Avevo 22 anni, ero single, non avevo una famiglia, non avevo persone che dipendessero da me; fu molto difficile per me che tanta gente che non ne era uscita viva aveva figli e familiari che mantenevano. Fu difficile per me sentire le persone dire che tutto succede per un motivo, perché c'erano molte persone ai piani più alti che non sopravvissero e questo per me non aveva alcun senso.


Undicisettembre: Cosa pensi dei pompieri che entrarono nelle Torri rischiando la propria vita per salvare gli altri?

Krista Salvatore: Sono eroi assoluti! Non c'è altro modo di descriverli, sapevano mentre salivano che non ne sarebbero usciti vivi. Quando il mio edificio fu colpito c'erano così tanti pompieri che salivano, stavano facendo tutto ciò che potevano per salvare vite e stavano dando la propria vita per farlo.


Undicisettembre: Hai sofferto di disturbo da stress post traumatico?

Krista Salvatore: Sì. Andai da un consulente per un po' di tempo, ero depressa e questo fu difficile perché la gente si aspettava che io fossi grata del fatto di stare bene ma ero depressa perché avevo molto senso di colpa.

Mi ci volle più di un anno per tornare in me, tuttora ci penso ogni giorno. Penso che ora sono grata di avere dei figli e di avere una discendenza. Ma ci penso ancora. Alcuni giorni, quando vedo alcune cose, sono più difficili di altri, ma di nuovo mi ci volle più di un anno per tornare davvero in me stessa.


Undicisettembre: L’11/9 come condiziona la tua vita quotidiana?

Krista Salvatore: Provo davvero ad essere grata per le piccole cose e a non stressarmi per le piccole cose e a rendermi conto che ci sono persone là fuori che combattono per assicurarsi che questo non succeda più, che non ci sia più un attacco sul suolo americano. Ci sono soldati che sono dispiegati e che stanno combattendo il terrorismo e io cerco di essere riconoscente per ciò che fanno.

Ogni 11/9 faccio una marcia con un gruppo di persone qui a Saint Louis, camminiamo per 21 miglia fino all'Arco [la foto accanto mostra l'intervistata con il padre alla marcia del 2015, N.d.R.], che è un monumento che abbiamo qui a Saint Louis, e portiamo tutti delle bandiere. Siamo da 600 a 1000 persone e ricordiamo le persone che sono morte quel giorno e le persone che stanno combattendo per noi. Ci sono molti pompieri e militari che fanno la marcia con noi.


Undicisettembre: Sei tornata a Ground Zero dopo l’11/9?

Krista Salvatore: Ci sono andata una volta nel 2003. È stato molto, molto difficile. È stato molto triste.

Vorrei davvero andarci di nuovo. Quando ci sono andata era un cantiere, quindi fu molto triste.


Undicisettembre: Cosa pensi delle teorie del complotto secondo le quali l’11/9 fu un autoattentato?

Krista Salvatore: È una totale stupidaggine. Non ci sono fatti a supporto di queste teorie.


Undicisettembre: Credi che la nazione viva ancora nella paura o pensi che abbia recuperato la sua posizione mondiale?

Krista Salvatore: Non credo che viviamo nella paura, ma per essere onesta mi spaventa un po' perché temo che stiamo abbassando la guardia. Dopo l’11/9 eravamo a un livello di allerta molto alto e abbiamo vissuto nella paura per un po', tutti erano ipersensibili che ogni cosa potesse potenzialmente essere una minaccia e ora siamo diventati meno guardinghi e questo mi fa un po’ temere che qualcosa del genere possa succedere ancora.

Some Thoughts on the 28 Pages

Note by Undicisettembre: this text was written for us by former FBI agent Mark Rossini as a personal commentary on the released 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry. We believe Rossini’s comments are very useful and provide a little-known and new insight about why prominent Saudi people helped two of the 9/11 hijackers while they were in the United States.

We would like to thank Mark Rossini for his willingness to help.

An Italian translation is available below.

by Mark Rossini

I do not believe or posture that the Saudi Government (The Royal House of Saud) facilitated, aided and abetted or "wanted" the 9/11 attacks to happen. This is the often repeated phrase of the 9/11 Commission members and the Bush and Obama Administrations. But it is a distraction. What the 9/11 Commission and both Administrations sought and seek to do is preserve the very important and necessary relationship with Saudi Arabia.

That said, what the 9/11 Commission and both administrations fail to do however is admit, based upon strong circumstantial evidence, that there were and are so-called prominent Saudis who provided money to NGO's which then funded directly and indirectly operatives who assisted the hijackers. Moreover, there is further circumstantial evidence to support the case that the Saudi government was permitted by the CIA to run a classic "Recruitment Operation" on US soil with the specific goal of recruiting hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi and to learn exactly why they were in the USA.

The Saudi Intelligence Service known as the Mabahith was given free reign to operate in the USA by the CIA, who purposefully and willfully did not inform the FBI and moreover covered up their actions during all post 9/11 inquiries. The reason why the CIA has not and will not admit their willful and purposeful suppression of a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) written by Special Agent Douglas J. Miller of the FBI who served with me at Alec Station at the CIA was that they, the CIA, did not want and could not allow the FBI in the persona of Special Agent in Charge, John P. O'Neill to interfere with the Saudi recruitment effort. The FBI would not have allowed it to happen. Even if the FBI had remotely agreed to participate in the recruitment operation, the CIA (Alec Station) had every reason to fear that O'Neill would have demanded direct command and control of the operation and that O'Neill would have not been "controllable" if he decided to stop the operation when he saw fit.

If the CIA was ever to be honest, was to tell the truth as to why Doug's CIR was suppressed, and admit the validity of the statement of Richard Clarke that the Saudis and the CIA tried to recruit al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, it could possibly mean, in the extreme, that the CIA would be abolished and the officers at Alec Station would face criminal charges. There is too much as stake. There are too many equities regarding our economy and long term strategic political goals in the Mid-East to allow a complete investigation.

As you know I have written much on this subject. Please refer to and read my writings in this document: [link to the document]

Qualche riflessione sulle 28 pagine

di Mark Rossini

Io non credo o ipotizzo che il governo saudita (la casa reale di al-Saud) abbia facilitato, favoreggiato o “voluto” gli attacchi dell'11/9. Questa è la frase spesso ripetuta dai membri della 9/11 Commission e dalle amministrazioni Obama e Bush. Ma è una distrazione. Ciò che la 9/11 Commission ed entrambe le amministrazioni hanno cercato e cercano tuttora di fare è preservare l’importantissima e necessaria relazione con l’Arabia Saudita.

Detto questo, ciò che la 9/11 Commission e le due amministrazioni non fanno è ammettere, in base a forti prove indiziarie, che c’erano e ci sono tuttora dei cosiddetti sauditi di rilievo che hanno fornito sovvenzioni alle ONG che a loro volta hanno finanziato direttamente o indirettamente gli agenti che hanno fornito assistenza ai dirottatori. Inoltre ci sono altre prove indiziarie a supporto della tesi che la CIA permise al governo saudita di condurre una tipica “operazione di reclutamento” sul suolo americano con lo scopo specifico di reclutare i dirottatori Khalid al-Mihdhar e Nawaf al-Hazmi e di scoprire esattamente perché si trovavano negli Stati Uniti.

La CIA diede al Servizio di Intelligence Saudita noto come Mabahith libertà di operare negli USA e intenzionalmente e consapevolemente non ne informò l’FBI e coprì le loro azioni durante tutte le indagini successive all’11/9. La ragione per cui la CIA non ha ammesso e non ammetterà la sua intenzionale e consapevole soppressione di un Central Intelligence Report (CIR) scritto dall’Agente Speciale Douglas J. Miller dell’FBI, che lavorò con me all’Alec Station presso la CIA, è che loro, la CIA, non volevano e non potevano consentire che l’FBI, nella persona dell’Agente Speciale incaricato, John P. O’Neill, interferisse nel tentativo di reclutamento saudita. L’FBI non avrebbe permesso che accadesse. Anche qualora l’FBI avesse, per ipotesi, accettato di partecipare alla missione di reclutamento, la CIA (Alec Station) aveva ogni ragione per temere che O’Neill avrebbe chiesto di comandare e controllare direttamente l’operazione e che O’Neill non sarebbe stato “controllabile” se avesse deciso di interrompere l’operazione quando lo avesse ritenuto opportuno.

Se la CIA fosse sincera e dicesse la verità sul perché il CIR di Doug è stato soppresso e ammettesse la validità dell’affermazione di Richard Clarke secondo la quale i Sauditi e la CIA tentatono di reclutare al-Mihdhar e al-Hazmi, questo comporterebbe al limite che la CIA verrebbe abolita e che i funzionari della Alec Station dovrebbero affrontato accuse penali. La posta è troppo alta. Nel Medio Oriente ci sono troppe risorse legate alla nostra economia e ai nostri obiettivi di strategia politica a lungo termine per consentire un’investigazione completa.

Come sai, ho scritto molto su questo argomento. Per favore, consulta e leggi quanto ho scritto in questo documento: [link al documento tradotto in italiano]

Gli scambi di identità di Abdulaziz al-Omari

di Hammer

Una delle argomentazioni complottiste più ricorrenti vuole che almeno alcune delle 19 persone identificate come i dirottatori dell’11/9 siano in realtà ancora vive e che gli inquirenti furono troppo rapidi nell’individuarle. Premesso che in quindici anni nessuno è stato in grado di produrre l’unica prova dell’esistenza in vita di queste persone, cioè farle apparire in pubblico, la verità è ancora una volta diversa da come descritta dai complottisti e uno dei casi più evidenti di ciò è rappresentato dai vari scambi di persona occorsi nell’identificazione del terrorista dirottatore Abdulaziz al-Omari (foto accanto), uno dei muscle hijacker del volo American Airlines 11.

Il primo comunicato dell’FBI con una prima lista dei dirottatori fu emesso il 14 settembre e riportava come possibili date di nascita di al-Omari il 24 dicembre 1972 o il 28 maggio 1979. Mentre la seconda data corrisponde davvero a quella del terrorista coinvolto negli attentati, la prima si riferisce a un saudita quasi omonimo di nome Abdul Rahman al-Omari, che di professione era un pilota di linea della Saudi Arabian Airlines e che aveva una casa in affitto a Vero Beach, in Florida. La nota dell’FBI dice anche Believed to be a pilot, cioè Ritenuto essere un pilota. Inoltre un affidavit dell’FBI pubblicato il 4 ottobre 2001 (pagina 4, ultima del documento PDF) riporta che al-Omari era collegato alla SADA Lines International (una compagnia di volo saudita) e alle operazioni di volo delle compagnie saudite all’aeroporto JFK di New York, portando così a ritenere che il pilota saudita fosse il dirottatore.

Perseverando nello scambio di persona, il 13 settembre sessanta agenti tra FBI e polizia locale perquisirono la casa di Vero Beach del pilota ingiustamente accusato e anche quella del suo collega e amico Adnan Bukhari. Anche la CNN contribuì all'equivoco, mostrando il 16 settembre tra le foto dei dirottatori del volo American Airlines 11 proprio quella del pilota che era completamente estraneo ai fatti.

Il 28 settembre l’FBI pubblicò le prime foto dei 19 dirottatori e fu quindi ovvio che si era trattato di uno scambio di persona; lo stesso giorno la giornalista della CNN Susan Candiotti chiarì l’equivoco definitivamente intervistando in Arabia Saudita il pilota Abdul Rahman al-Omari (foto sotto, tratta dal video della CNN), che era evidentemente vivo. Il video dell’intervista e le foto trasmesse dalla CNN sono disponibili su 911myths.com.

Nei primi giorni successivi agli attentati i dubbi sull’identità di al-Omari non si fermarono al pilota saudita, ma un altro uomo con lo stesso nome del terrorista e con la stessa data di nascita del pilota ritenne che l’FBI stesse indicando lui come uno dei dirottatori e si sentì in necessità di chiarire di essere estraneo agli attentati. L'uomo in questione era un ingegnere che lavorava per la Saudi Telecom Company e a cui fu rubato il passaporto nel 1995, mentre si trovava a Denver per frequentare l’università, durante un furto con scasso occorso all’appartamento in cui viveva. Al momento degli attentati l’ingegnere si trovava al lavoro a Riyhad.

Nelle indagini giornalistiche pubblicate nei giorni successivi agli attentati, la prima ipotesi fu che i dirottatori avessero usato false identità spacciandosi per omonimi e non che più banalmente l’FBI avesse confuso i dirottatori con persone dal nome simile.

A distanza di 15 anni, comunque, la confusione non è estinta. Wikipedia, infatti, fino a poco tempo fa mostrava sia nella pagina dedicata al terrorista sia in quella dedicata al pilota come foto di quest’ultimo quella dell’ingegnere. La stessa foto (mostrata anche qui accanto) fu infatti riportata dalla BBC specificando che si trattava dell’ingegnere. L’errore su Wikipedia è stato corretto su entrambe le pagine da Undicisettembre. Inoltre la pagina dedicata al terrorista riportava, fino al nostro intervento, che al-Omari prese lezioni da pilota d’aereo a Vero Beach, ma questo non corrisponde al vero, come confermato dalla stessa FlightSafety Academy presso cui l'uomo avrebbe svolto la formazione. Di nuovo l’equivoco è nato dal fatto che il pilota Abdul Rahman al-Omari frequentò quella scuola di volo nell’ambito della propria attività professionale.

È un vero peccato che i complottisti non capiscano che esistono le omonimie e preferiscano credere che i terroristi sono ancora vivi. Del resto, se vogliono farci credere che Abdulaziz al-Omari, il dirottatore nato nell’ʿAsīr il 28 maggio del 1979, è ancora vivo non devono fare altro che mostrarcelo in vita.

Cosa dicono le 28 pagine desecretate del Joint Inquiry

di Hammer

Il 15 luglio del 2016 sono state finalmente desecretate le 28 pagine del Joint Inquiry rimaste secretate a seguito della pubblicazione del rapporto nel dicembre del 2002. Le 28 pagine in questione riguardano i legami tra i dirottatori ed esponenti del governo saudita, e proprio per questo motivo sono state tenute nascoste per così tanto tempo. Il testo integrale delle 28 pagine è stato trascritto e pubblicato integralmente anche da Undicisettembre per ovviare alla scarsa qualità delle scansioni originali.

Basandosi su numerosi documenti dell'FBI e su un memorandum della CIA il testo indica che alcuni dei 19 dirottatori durante la loro permanenza sul suolo americano ebbero contatti con personalità riconducibili all'intelligence, alla diplomazia e al governo dell’Arabia Saudita. Tra le persone che entrarono in contatto con i terroristi vi sarebbero stati Omar al-Bayoumi e Osama Bassnan, che diedero supporto logistico ai dirottatori Khalid al-Mihdhar e Nawaf al-Hazmi a San Diego; Shaykh al-Thumairy, imam di una moschea a Culver City creata con fondi statali sauditi, nota per le sue posizioni estreme e frequentata da al-Mihdhar e Nawaf al-Hazmi; Saleh al-Hussayen, ufficiale del ministero degli interni saudita, che alloggiò nello stesso albergo di al-Hazmi in Virginia; e Abdullah Bin Ladin, fratellastro di Osama e dipendente dell'ambasciata saudita a Washington.

Il memorandum della CIA da cui la commissione ha appreso di questi legami non venne mai inoltrato all'FBI, che rimase quindi all'oscuro di queste attività. Il testo specifica comunque che tutte queste asserzioni sono di natura indiziaria e che sarebbe stato necessario verificarle. Il Joint Inquiry specifica anche che potrebbe esistere una spiegazione plausibile per tutti questi legami che non preveda accordi clandestini tra il governo saudita e al-Qaeda.

Delle persone sopra elencate, quelle più importanti, a cui il testo dedica maggior spazio, sono Omar al-Bayoumi e Osama Bassnan, i quali offrirono ad al-Mihdhar e al-Hazmi supporto logistico, dapprima ospitandoli nella casa di al-Bayoumi a San Diego e poi aiutandoli a trovare un appartamento, di cui pagarono la prima rata dell'affitto, e favorendo la loro integrazione con il centro islamico di San Diego. Il primo contatto tra al-Bayoumi e i terroristi avvenne a seguito di un incontro, che tutti e tre vollero far apparire come fortuito, in un esercizio pubblico. Al-Bayoumi e Bassnan avevano forti legami con il governo saudita, come testimoniato anche dai loro tabulati telefonici e dalle sovvenzioni che i due uomini e le loro mogli ricevevano regolarmente dall'ambasciata. Inoltre al-Bayoumi riceveva mensilmente uno stipendio da una compagnia saudita con sede negli USA (presso la quale non lavorava regolarmente), che aveva a legami con il ministero della difesa dell'Arabia Saudita e con Osama bin Laden. L'azienda gli aumentò lo stipendio durante il periodo in cui aiutò i due terroristi. Secondo quanto appreso dall'FBI, sia al-Bayoumi sia Bassnan erano anche ritenuti agenti dell'intelligence saudita.

I legami tra il governo saudita e al-Qaeda non si fermerebbero ai dirottatori dell'11/9 ma coinvolgerebbero anche altri gruppi, come testimoniato dal fatto che nel cellulare del terrorista Abu Zubaida, uno degli operativi di al-Qaeda catturato in Pakistan nel 2002, furono trovati numeri di telefono appartenenti a dipendenti dell'ambasciata saudita a Washington.

Nonostante questi evidenti legami, dopo l’11/9 la cooperazione del governo saudita nelle indagini sui dirottatori fu sempre molto scarsa, ma la mancanza di collaborazione era un’abitudine del governo di Riyadh già da ben prima dell'11/9. A tal proposito vengono citati nel testo due casi risalenti agli anni 90, ovvero quelli di Madani al-Tayyib e Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, che avevano stretti legami con Osama bin Laden e a cui il governo saudita ha sempre offerto protezione, negando agli USA il permesso di interrogarli.

Pochi giorni dopo la pubblicazione del testo, ABC news ha pubblicato la reazione di Richard Clarke, che avanza un'ipotesi interessante sul perché al-Bayoumi abbia potuto offrire così tanta assistenza ai due terroristi in modo del tutto incontrastato. Clarke sostiene che, sebbene questa ipotesi non sia stata considerata né dalla 9/11 Commission né dalla commissione governativa, al-Bayoumi potesse essere una spia dei servizi segreti sauditi a cui la CIA aveva chiesto di investigare sui due terroristi, delegando l'indagine ai colleghi sauditi così da aggirare il limite di non poter condurre operazioni di intelligence all'interno degli USA (compito che spetta all'FBI).

Quella di Clarke resta un'ipotesi, ma come suggerisce lo stesso Coordinatore Nazionale per la Sicurezza è opportuno, ora che le 28 pagine sono state desecretate, continuare le indagini per capire a fondo perché l'11/9 non fu evitato nonostante le informazioni in possesso dell'intelligence fossero ampiamente sufficienti.


Fonti aggiuntive: The Intercept.

Transcript of the freshly released 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry

by Paolo Attivissimo

This is a very quick transcript of the 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry that have just been released. There will be typos: please point them out in the comments. Any typos in the original text have been transcribed verbatim, so please check against the original before reporting a mistake. Last updated 2016/07/17.

The cover letter

DAC – 00917 – 03

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC

January 29, 2003

The Honorable George J Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As you know, the final report of the Joint Inquiry into the events of September 11 has been submitted to the Intelligence Community for declassification review. We look forward to early release of the public report so that efforts at reforms can be accelerated.

Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan, bicameral investigation last year, we are committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of its recommendations. In furtherance of that goal, we are writing to the President and heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry’s recommendations that may be of particular concern to them.

Our first recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, who in addition to being the President’s principal intelligence adviser "shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole." To help promote both strong leadership of the entire Intelligence Community leadership and an effective CIA, the Joint Inquiry also recommended that Congress provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other agency. In considering this recommendation, the Congress will certainly, we believe, benefit from learning of your views about the strengthening of the role of head of the Intelligence Community.

A number of the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the Director of National Intelligence, but is that reform will require study and deliberation, for the immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of Central Intelligence as the present statutory head of the Intelligence Community.

The Joint Inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the U.S. Government as a whole are the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy. One of our recommendations calls on the National Security Council, in conjunction with key agency and department heads, to prepare such a strategy for the President’s approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be "government wide," apply both "home and abroad," and include "the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies." The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the intelligence as well as foreign policy, economic, military and law enforcement elements that are "critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism." The Director of Central Intelligence’s full participation in this overall process will be essential, as will the DCI’s development of the Intelligence Community component of the full strategy. The Joint Inquiry recommended that the Intelligence Community’s component of the overall strategy include a number of important items, among them development of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.

To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the National Intelligence Council of the position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also assist the Intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis.

Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center, as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the recommendation states, on the center’s "full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including 'raw' supporting data as needed." Your action to ensure full cooperation between the entire Intelligence Community (including, of course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security will be fundamental to the success of this vital reform. We applaud the President’s announcement of the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which we understand will be located under the Director of Central Intelligence. The important challenge, we believe, is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.

The recommendations include a list of significant reforms that the Intelligence Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI’s domestic intelligence capability. In regard to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community, together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should report to Congress on the FBI’s progress. The report should include "the specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties."

The Committees expressed their strong conviction that "the Intelligence Community’s employees remain its greatest resource." They recommend that the head of the Intelligence Community "should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts." Several particular actions are set forth in the recommendation. One is that Intelligence Community agencies should expand and improve counterterrorism training, including about information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel, the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and watchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to "enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce."

A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part, that Congress enact legislation, modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instill the concept of "jointness" throughout the Intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as incentives for joint service throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration’s detailed proposals.

The Joint Inquiry identified several important objectives concerning classified information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, by state and local authorities, and by the American public. To this end, we recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of key components of the Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General, should report to the Intelligence Committees on "proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and classified information." The report should also address "proposals to protect against the use of the classification process is a shield to protect agency self-interest."

The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and response to these and other matters identified in the course of the Joint Inquiry. Further, we are confident that the Congress will benefit from other recommendations that you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation’s counterterrorist capabilities.

Sincerely,

Bob Graham
Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee, 107th Congress

Porter Goss
Chairman, House Intelligence Committee, 107th and 108th Congresses

Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee, 107th Congress

Nancy Pelosi
Ranking Minority Member, House Intelligence Committee, 107th Congress and Member ex officio (as Minority Leader), 108th Congress

Enclosure: As stated

The Report - Cover Page

[redacted - possibly "Top secret..."]

S.REPT. NO. 107– 107TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION H.REPT. NO. 107-

JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

REPORT

OF THE

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

AND

U.S .HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS

DECEMBER 2002

The Report - Page 415

PART FOUR – FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

20. Finding: While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of these individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry’s review confirms that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA have informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11 attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government’s ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA nor FBI witnesses were able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBI’s Washington Field Office created a squad devoted to [redacted]. Only recently, and at least in part due to the Joint Inquiry’s focus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in U.S. intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy of the potential risk to U.S. national security. The Intelligence Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.

Discussion: One reason for the limited understanding is that it was only after September 11 that the U.S. Government began to aggressively investigate this issue. Prior to September 11th, the FBI apparently did not focus investigative resources on [redacted] Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia’s status as an American "ally." A representative of the FBI [redacted] testified that, prior to

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September 11, 2001, the FBI received "no reporting from any member of the Intelligence Community" that there was a [redacted] presence in the United States.

According to various FBI documents and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the September 11 hijackers, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who may be connected to the Saudi government. While the Joint Inquiry uncovered this material during the course of its review of FBI and CIA documents, it did not attempt to investigate and assess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, recognizing that such a task would be beyond the scope of this Joint Inquiry. Instead, the Joint Inquiry referred a detailed compilation of information uncovered by the Inquiry in documents and interviews to the FBI and CIA for further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available information regarding some of these individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report:

– Omar al-Bayoumi. The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals in the Muslim community, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayoumi may be a Saudi intelligence officer. FBI files suggest that al-Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi after they arrived in San Diego in February 2000. Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his meeting with an individual at the Saudi consulate and there are indications in the files that his encounter with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this same timeframe, al-Bayoumi had extensive contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of Defense. According to FBI files, [redacted] at the company said that al-Bayoumi received a monthly salary even though he had been there on only one occasion. This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in San Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000, and stayed at that same level until August 2001. That company reportedly has ties to Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida. In addition, the FBI determined that al-Bayoumi was in contact with several individuals under FBI investigation and with the Holy Land Foundation, which has been under investigation as a fundraising front for Hamas;

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– Osama Bassnan. Bassnan may have been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi during their time in San Diego. Bassnan was a close associate of al-Bayoumi and Omar Bakarbashat, another one of the hijackers’ close associates. He also lived across the street from the hijackers, and made a comment to an FBI asset that he did more than al-Bayoumi did for the hijackers. According to an FBI documents, Bassnan told another individual that he met al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi and later that he met two of the hijackers through al-Bayoumi. He also told the asset that al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar very well. The document goes on to state that Bassnan and al-Bayoumi have been "close to each other for a long time." Bassnan has many ties to the Saudi Government, including past employment by the Saudi Arabian Education Mission, referred to in FBI documents as [redacted]. The FBI also received reports from individuals in the Muslim community alleging that Bassnan might be a Saudi intelligence officer. According to a CIA memo, Bassnan reportedly received funding and possibly a fake passport from Saudi Government officials. He and his wife have received financial support from the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and his wife. A CIA report also indicates that Bassnan traveled to Houston in 2002 and met with an individual who was [redacted]. The report states that during that trip a member of the Saudi Royal Family provided Bassnan with a significant amount of cash. FBI information indicates that Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Usama bin Ladin, and has been connected to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad and the Blind Shaykh;

– Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar may have been in contact with Shaykh al-Thumairy, an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and one of the "imams" at the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California. Also according to FBI documents, the mosque was built in 1998 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely recognized for its anti-Western views;

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– Saleh al-Hussayen. In September 2001, Saleh al-Hussayen, reportedly a Saudi Interior Ministry official, stayed at the same hotel in Herndon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying. While al-Hussayen claimed after September 11 not to know the hijackers, FBI agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to depart the United States despite FBI efforts to locate and re-interview him; and

– Abdullah Bin Ladin. Abdullah Bin Ladin claims to work for the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. as an administrative officer. He is identified by the FBI as Usama bin Ladin’s half brother. He is a close friend of Mohammed Quadir-Harumani, a possible associate of Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi prior to September 11, 2001.

The Joint Inquiry also found other indications that individuals connected to the Saudi Government have ties to terrorist networks, including:

– The CIA and FBI have identified the Ton Tamiyah Mosque in Culver City as a site of extremist-related activity. Several subjects of FBI investigations prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque and are believed to have laundered money through this mosque to non-profit organizations overseas affiliated with Usama bin Ladin. In an interview, an FBI agent said he believed that Saudi Government money was being laundered through the mosque;

– Another Saudi national with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, [redacted], is the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations and reportedly was checking security at the United States' southwest border in 1999 and discussing the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States;

– According to FBI documents, several of the phone numbers found in the phone book of Abu Zubaida, a senior al-Qa’ida operative captured in Pakistan in March 2002, could be linked at least, at least indirectly, to telephone numbers in the United States. One of those U.S. numbers is subscribed to by the ASPCOL Corp., which is located in Aspen,

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Colorado, and manages the affairs of the Colorado residents of the Saudi Ambassador Bandar. The FBI noticed that ASPCOL has an unlisted telephone number. A November 18, 2002 FBI response to the Joint Inquiry states that "CIA traces have revealed no direct links between numbers found in Zubaida’s phone book and numbers in the United States."

– According to an FBI document, the telephone number of a bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC, who some have alleged may be a [redacted] was also found in Abu Zubaida’s possessions; and

– According to an FBI agent in Phoenix, the FBI suspects Mohammed al-Qudhaeein of being [redacted] Al-Qudhaeein was involved in a 1999 incident aboard an America West flight, which the FBI’s Phoenix office now suspects may have been a "dry run" to test airline security. During the flight, al-Qudhaeein and his associate asked the flight attendants a variety of suspicious questions; al-Qudhaeein then attempted to enter the cockpit on two occasions. Al-Qudhaeein and his associate were flying to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed that their tickets were paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During the course of its investigations, the FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaeein and the other individual involved in this incident had connections to terrorism.

Finally, the Committees are particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations contained in a CIA memorandum found by the Joint Inquiry Staff in the files of the FBI’s San Diego Field Office. That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial connections between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a CIA officer [redacted], relying primarily on information from FBI files. The CIA officer sent it to the CTC to determine whether CIA had additional information. He also provided a copy to the FBI agent responsible for the investigation of one of the individuals discussed in the memorandum. Despite the clear national implications of the CIA memorandum, the FBI agent included the memorandum in an individual case file and did not forward it to FBI Headquarters. FBI Headquarters, therefore, was unaware

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of statements in the memorandum until the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandums implication to the Bureau’s attention. [redacted]


Possible Saudi Government Connections to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups

While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, from FBI sources, that at least two of those individuals were alleged to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry’s review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which remains speculative and yet to be independently verified, indicating that Saudi government officials in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups.

The Committees are particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations contained in a CIA memorandum found within the files of the FBI’s San Diego Field Office. That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial connections between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi royal family, was drafted by a CIA officer [redacted], relying primarily on information from FBI files.

In their testimony before the Joint Inquiry, neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to definitively identify for these Committees the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is intentional or innocent in nature. Both the FBI and CIA have indicated to the Committees that they are now aggressively pursuing Saudi-related terrorism issues.

Prior to September 11th, the FBI apparently did not focus investigative [redacted] Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia’s status as an American "ally". [redacted]. A representative of the FBI’s [redacted] testified in closed

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hearings that, prior to September 11th, the FBI received "no reporting from any member of the Intelligence Community" that there is a [redacted] presence in the United States.

It should be clear that this Joint Inquiry has made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues that we found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the task of this joint Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determined the true significance of any such alleged connections to the Saudi Government. On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a [redacted] dated July 2, 2002, "incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi government." On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.

Given the serious national security implications of this information, however, the leadership of the Joint Inquiring is referring the staff’s compilation of relevant information to both the FBI and the CIA for investigative review and appropriate investigative and intelligence action.


Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Officials in the United States

In reviewing FBI documents and the CIA memorandum, the Joint Inquiry Staff has examined information suggesting that:

– One individual who provided assistance to Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar may be connected to the Saudi government. A second individual who may have been in contact with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar also has ties to the Saudi government, including connections to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. There is reporting in FBI files that persons have alleged that both of these individuals may be Saudi intelligence officers;

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– The September 11 hijackers may have been in contact with other Saudi Government officials in the United States prior to the September 11 attacks; and

– Saudi Government officials in the United States may have ties to Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network.


Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan

Two individuals known to the FBI prior to September 11, 2001 – Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan – may have provided assistance or support to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while the two hijackers-to-be were living in San Diego. While the documentary evidence that al-Bayoumi provided assistance to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar is solid, the files contain only limited evidence that Osama Bassnan had contacts with the two individuals.

When al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved to San Diego, al-Bayoumi provided them with considerable assistance. Before the hijackers moved in with the long-time FBI informant, they stayed at al-Bayoumi’s apartment for several days until al-Bayoumi was able to find them an apartment. Al-Bayoumi then co-signed their lease and may have paid their first month’s rent and security deposit.¹ After al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved into their own apartment, al-Bayoumi threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego community. He also tasked Modhar Abdullah, another individual from the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), to help get them acclimated to the United States. Abdullah served as their translator, helped them get drivers’ licenses, and assisted them in locating flight schools. [redacted]

1. he FBI notes, in its November 18, 2002 response that "financial records indicate a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier’s check into al-Bayoumi’s bank account on the same day, which suggests that the hijackers reimbursed him." FBI November 18 Response, 3. However, another FBI document, dated October 14, 2002, appears to reach a slightly different conclusion. This document states that "a review of Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s bank records indicates there is no bank documentation that supports the reimbursement of [the rent money], or any monies to Omar Al-Bayoumi from al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdhar."

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During the post-September 11 investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi had far more extensive ties to the Saudi Government than previously realized. In fact, according to an October 14, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has "extensive ties to the Saudi Government." The connections identified by the FBI are:

– Al-Bayoumi had been an accountant at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from 1976 to 1993, when he relocated to the United States;

– According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the Emir at the Saudi Ministry of Defense, responsible for air traffic control;

– The FBI has also located records, indicating that al-Bayoumi received $20,000 from the Saudi Ministry of Finance at one point;

– When al-Bayoumi applied to schools in the United States in 1998, he had a letter from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia; and

– While in San Diego, al-Bayoumi was receiving money from the Saudi Ministry of Defense through a Saudi company called "Erean" [redacted] of that company informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that, although al-Bayoumi only showed up at the company on one occasion, he received a monthly salary and allowances. [redacted] stated that, at first, he attempted to refuse to pay al-Bayoumi a monthly salary, but he was told that his company would lose their contract if he done did not pay him. [redacted] informed the FBI that at that time, he attributed this to Saudi corruption.

Al-Bayoumi also had frequent contact with Saudi establishments in the United States. In a review of telephone toll records, the FBI learned that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Government establishments in the United States almost 100 times between January and May 2000. According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in contact with at least three individuals at the Saudi

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Embassy in Washington, DC; two individuals of the Saudi Arabia Cultural Mission in Washington, DC, and three individuals at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. In a search of Bayoumi’s [redacted] [redacted], they also discovered that he had the phone number for an individual at the Saudi Consulate in London.

Two former San Diego agents addressed the issue of whether al-Bayoumi was an intelligence officer at the October 9, 2002 closed hearing. The former case agent who handled Muppet testified:

[Al-Bayoumi] acted like a Saudi intelligence officer, in my opinion. And if he was involved with the hijackers, which it looks like he was, if he signed leases, if he provided some sort of financing or payment of some sort, then I would say that there is a clear possibility that there might be a connection between Saudi intelligence and UBL.

A former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego testified that the FBI received "numerous, I would say half a dozen" reports from individuals who believed that al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence officer. The FBI’s November 18th response is inconsistent as to whether the FBI currently is designating al-Bayoumi as a suspected Saudi intelligence officer. In its response, the FBI notes that al-Bayoumi [redacted] until after September 11th, but the response also states that "there is no evidence" to conclude that al-Bayoumi is a Saudi intelligence officer.

The FBI had received reporting from a reliable source well prior to September 11, 2001 indicating that al-Bayoumi might be a Saudi intelligence officer. Al-Bayoumi was known to have access to large amounts of money from Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that he did not appear to hold a job. On one occasion prior to September 11, the FBI received information that al-Bayoumi had received $400,000 from Saudi Arabia to help fund a new mosque in San Diego. The FBI conducted a counterterrorism investigation on al-Bayoumi in 1998 and 1999, but close to the investigation at that point.

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Since September 11, 2001 FBI investigation relieved revealed that al-Bayoumi has some ties to terrorist elements. Pasquale J. D’Amuro, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence testified in the October 9, 2002 hearing that

[w]e’ve been talking with the [redacted] Government about collection on an individual named [redacted] who has ties to al-Qa’ida, who has ties to Bayoumi.

In addition, the FBI reported the results of their search of al-Bayoumi’s [redacted] that, "after an exhaustive translations of Bayoumi’s documents, it is clear that in Bayoumi’s correspondence he is providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can be interpreted as jihadist."

According to information acquired by the FBI after September 11, 2001, al-Bayoumi also noted on one of his school applications that he worked for a company called "Dallah/Avco." According to the FBI, Erean is a San Diego subcontractor of Dallah/Avco. According to a separate [redacted] document, Dallah and Avco are under the same umbrella company, Avco Dallah Trans Arab, which is a subsidiary of Al Barakaat Investment and Development Company. Avco Dallah reportedly holds the contracts for cleaning and maintenance at the three major airports in Saudi Arabia. The [redacted] document states that [redacted] the company has links to Usama bin Ladin. FBI Headquarters was informed of the affiliation between Dallah/Avco and Al Barakaat in February 2001, but the San Diego Field Office apparently never got to this information.

According to FBI documents, al-Bayoumi’s pay increase during the time that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were in the United States. According to a recent [redacted] analysis of ties between the terrorist attacks and elements of the Saudi Government, before al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in the U.S., al-Bayoumi generally received approximately $465 per month in "allowances." According to the [redacted] document, in March 2000, a month after al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, his "allowances" jumped to over $3700 a month and stayed constant until December 2000, when al-Hazmi left San Diego. Al-Bayoumi’s allowances were then decreased to approximately $3,200 a month and stayed at that rate until al-Bayoumi left the United States in August 2001, approximately one month before the September 11th attacks.

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The [redacted] memorandum dated July 2, 2002, incorrectly noted that al-Bayoumi’s wife, while living in San Diego, which was receiving $1200 a month from Princess Haifa Bint Sultan, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The FBI has now confirmed that only Osama Bassnan's wife received money directly from Prince Bandar’s wife, but that al-Bayoumi’s wife attempted to deposit three of the checks from Prince Bandar’s wife, which were payable to Bassan’s wife, into her own accounts.

The Joint Inquiry also found, in FBI files, information just suggesting that Osama Bassnan may also have may have also been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, including:

– Bassman was a very close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi’s and was in telephone contact with al-Bayoumi several times a day while they were both in San Diego. Bassnan also has close ties to a number of other individuals connected to the hijackers, including Omar Bakarbashat, discussed below, who is referred to in FBI documents as Bassnan’s brother-in-law;

– According to an October 16, 2001 FBI document, Bassnan informed an asset that he had met Nawaf al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. He went on to say that he met two of the nineteen hijackers through Omar al-Bayoumi. According to the FBI document, he also told the asset that al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar very well. The document goes on to state that Bassnan and al-Bayoumi have been "close to each other for a long time."

– Bassnan lived in the apartment complex in San Diego across the street from al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar;

– Bassnan made a comment to an FBI source after the September 11 attacks suggesting that he did more for the hijackers than al Bayoumi did;

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– The FBI is aware of contact between the hijackers and a close friend of Bassnan’s, Khaled al-Kayed, a commercial airline pilot and certified flight instructor living in San Diego. Al-Kayed admitted to the FBI that in May 2000, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi contacted him about learning to fly Boeing jet aircraft;

FBI documents speculate that Osama Bassnan [redacted] The FBI’s November 18, 2002 response contends that this was an early investigative theory based on asset reporting which the FBI has not been able to corroborate. However, there is also additional information possibly tying Bassnan to [redacted] In 1992, while he was living in Washington, DC, Bassnan listed his employment as the Saudi Arabian Education Mission. FBI documents state that [redacted]

Bassnan also has other ties to the Saudi Government. Bassnan’s wife received a monthly stipend from Princess Haifa. In a recent search of Bassnan's residence, the FBI located copies of 31 cashiers checks totaling $74,000, during the period February 22, 1999 to May 30, 2002. These checks were payable to Bassnan’s wife and were drawn on the Riggs Bank account of Prince Bandar's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a standing order on Princess Haifa’s account since January 1999 to send $2000 a month to Bassnan’s wife. Bassnan’s wife was allegedly receiving the funding for "nursing services," but, according to the [redacted] document, there is no evidence that Bassnan’s wife provided nursing services. [redacted]

On at least one occasion, Bassnan received a check directly from Prince Bandar’s account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bassnan cashed a check from Bandar in the amount of $15,000. Bassnan’s wife also received at least one check directly from Bandar. She also received one additional check from Bandar’s wife, which she cashed on January 8, 1998, for $10,000.

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In the October 9, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director D’Amuro commented on this funding:

I believe that we do have money going from Bandar’s wife, $2000 a month up to about $64,000. What the money was for is what we don't know."

[redacted] testified:

[redacted]. She gives money to a lot of different groups and people from around the world. We’ve been able to uncover a number of these… But maybe if we can discover that she gives to 20 different radical groups, well, gee, maybe there’s a pattern here.

The FBI has also developed additional information clearly indicating that Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Usama bin Ladin. In 1993, the FBI became aware that Bassnan had hosted a party for the Blind Shaykh at his house in Washington, DC in October 1992. Bassnan has made many laudatory remarks to FBI assets about Bin Ladin, referring to Bin Ladin as the official Khalifate and the ruler of the Islamic world. According to an FBI asset, Bassnan spoke of Bin Ladin "as if he were a god." Bassnan also stated to an FBI asset that he heard that the U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He considered such measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years. According to FBI documents, Bassnan also knew Bin Ladin’s family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile telephone with members of the family who are living in the United States.


Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubaida to a Company in the United States and a Saudi Diplomat in Washington

On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces retrieved the telephone book of Abu Zubaida, whom the U.S. Government has identified as a senior al-Qa’ida operational coordinator. According to an FBI documents, "a review of toll records has linked several of the numbers found in Zubaida's phonebook with U.S. phone numbers." One of the numbers is unlisted and subscribed to by the ASPCOL Corp. in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002,

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FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Office requiring that it investigate this connection. On September 19, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded, stating that they had completed their initial investigation.

According to the FBI’s Denver Office, ASPCOL is the umbrella corporation that manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agents of the Denver Field Office noted that neitherASPCOL nor Scimitar Security is listed in the phone book or is easily locatable. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State’s office has no record of ASPCOL. The Denver office did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOL, as they believed that any inquiries regarding ASPCOL would be quickly known by Prince Bandar’s employees. Due to the sensitivity of this matter, they decided to hold their investigation of ASPCOL in abeyance until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters.

According to the FBI, the phone number of an individual named [redacted] of McLean, Virginia was found within the effects of Abu Zubaida. [redacted] is reportedly a bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. The FBI now suspects that he may be a [redacted]. In a September 17, 2002 document, the FBI notes that the Bureau is opening an investigation on [redacted] due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. It also appears that [redacted] has been in contact with [redacted], which is located at [redacted], in McLean, Virginia. The FBI has identified this address as the address of Prince Bandar. According to the FBI, [redacted] is officially a driver for the Saudi Embassy. [Redacted] number was also linked to ASPCOL, Prince Bandar’s umbrella company located in Colorado.

It should be noted that the FBI’s November 18, 2002 response states that "CIA traces have revealed no direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found in Zubaida’s phone book and numbers in the United States."

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The U.S. government also located another Virginia number at an Usama Bin Ladin safehouse in Pakistan. The number is subscribed to by an individual named [redacted] was interviewed by the FBI in June 2002. He could not explain why his number ended up at a safehouse in Pakistan, but stated that he regularly provides services to a couple who are personal assistants to Prince Bandar. This couple’s driver is an individual named [redacted], who is assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. According to [redacted] regularly called [redacted] business and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan.


Other Saudi Government Officials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact with the September 11 Hijackers

Among the individuals who may have been associates of the al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to the [redacted] memorandum reviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff, "initial indications are that al-Thumairy may have had a physical or financial connection to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, but we are still looking at this possibility." Al-Thumairy is an accredited diplomat of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is also considered one of the "imams" at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California. [redacted]

According to FBI documents, the King Fahad mosque was built in 1998 from funding from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views. FBI documents indicate that Mohdhar Abdullah drove al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the King Fahad Mosque before al-Mihdhar returned to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on the East Coast whom the hijackers may have met may also have had connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI discovered that, during September 2001, an individual named Saleh al-Hussayen stayed at the same hotel in Herndon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying at the time. According to FBI documents al-Hussayen is apparently "Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official." He claimed not to know the hijackers,

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but agents in the FBI’s Washington Field Office believed he was being deceptive. The interviewed interview was terminated when al Hussayen either passed out or feigned a seizure requiring medical treatment. He was released from the hospital several days later and managed to depart the United States despite law enforcement efforts to locate and re-interview him.

Saleh al-Hussayen is the uncle of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Sami al-Hussayen is connected to the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) and is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Saleh al-Hussayen is a major contributor to the IANA, a nonprofit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to the spread of Islam worldwide. According to the FBI, the IANA’s mission is actually to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and the world at large. The IANA solicits funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors, extremist Islamic Shaykhs, and suspect non-governmental organizations. According to FBI documents, IANA has solicited money from Prince Bandar, but the documents are unclear as to whether Bandar actually contributed money to this organization.

FBI documents also indicate the several Saudi Naval officers were in contact with the September 11 hijackers. FBI documents state that the San Diego Field office opened a counterterrorism investigation on an individual named Osama Nooh, a Saudi Naval officer, due to his association with Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In addition, Lafi al-Harbi, another Saudi Naval officer, was in telephonic contact with flight 77 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi on nine occasions from March 11, 2000 to March 27, 2000.

The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether Saleh Ahmed Bedaiwi, a Saudi Naval officer within its territory was in contact with any of the hijackers. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

The FBI has also discovered some more tenuous connections between Saudi Government personnel and the hijackers during the course of the PENTTBOM investigation. For example, according to the FBI, an individual named Faleh Abdullah Saleh Bakala was close friends with September 11 hijackers Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Ghamdi. Bakala previously "worked as a pilot for the Saudi royal family, flying Usama Bin Ladin between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia during UBL’s exile." In addition, an FBI source stated after September 11 that he/she was 50% sure that al-Mihdhar was a visitor at an apartment in McLean, Virginia that was occupied in July and August 2001 by Hamad Alotaibi of the Saudi Embassy Military Division. FBI documents also notes that September 11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi may have also visited the address.


Connections Between Saudi Government Officials in the United States and Other Possible Terrorist Operatives

The Joint Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI files, suggesting other possible connections between Saudi Government officials and terrorist operatives.

For example, according to FBI documents, there is evidence that hijackers Marwan al-Shehhi and Mohammed Atta were in contact with Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation since 1999 and a close associate of Abdullah Bin Ladin, who is referred to in FBI documents as Usama Bin Ladin’s half brother. Abdullah Bin Ladin, who is the subject of several FBI investigations, is currently in the United States [redacted] He claims to work for the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC as an administrative officer. Abdullah Bin Ladin has financed Quadir’s company and is listed by Quadir as the emergency contact for Quadir’s children. They are in frequent email and phone contact as well.

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According to the FBI, Abdullah Bin Ladin has a number of connections to terrorist organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America. Both organizations are local branches of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY is "closely associated with the funding and financing of international terrorist activities and in the past has provided logistical support to individuals wishing to fight in the Afghan war." In 1998, the CIA published a paper characterizing WAMY as a NGO that provides funding, logistical support and training with possible connections to the Arab Afghans network, Hamas, Algerian extremists, and Philippine militants.²

Also of potential interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mohammed al-Qudhaeein and Hamdan al-Shalawi. Al-Qudhaeein and al-Shalawi were flying from Phoenix to Washington, DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight that the flight attendants found suspicious. When the plane was in flight, al-Qudhaeein asked where the bathroom was; one of the flight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless, al-Qudhaeein went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to pursue a prosecution. At the time, al-Qudhaeein and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy paid for their airplane tickets.

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation was driving al-Shalawi’s car, the Bureau opened a counterterrorism investigation on al-Shalawi. In November 2000, the FBI received reporting from [redacted] that al-Shalawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had received explosives training to perform "Khobar Towers"-type attacks. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Office attached even potentially greater significance to that 1999 incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this: "Phoenix FBI now

2. According to the FBI’s November 18, 2002 response, although several officials in WAMY support al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups, the intelligence is insufficient to show whether the organization as a whole and its senior leadership support terrorism.

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believes both men were specifically attempting to test the security procedures of America West Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBL/Al Qaeda operations."

In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the agent who drafted the "Phoenix EC" stated:

In a post-911 world, I went back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry run. It is currently under investigation.

After September 11, 2001, al-Qudhaeein [redacted]

In interviews, a Phoenix FBI agent stated that Phoenix [redacted] believed that al-Qudhaeein might be [redacted]. His profile is similar to that of al-Bayoumi and Bassman. He is in the United States as a student and does not have a visible means of income. He is in frequent contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United States and appears to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. He runs a "Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and assists Saudi students in the area. The FBI has also developed information that al-Qudhaeein was receiving money from the Saudi Government but, as of August 2002, had not obtained the relevant bank records for review. The FBI’s Phoenix Field Office has speculated that al-Qudhaeein and others may be [redacted]

There are other indications in FBI files that elements of the Saudi Government may have provided support to terrorist networks. For example, the FBI had identified the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Culver City as a site of extremist-related activity both before and after September 11. Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time that these subjects were laundering money through this mosque first to Somali non-profit organizations and then to other entities affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin.

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In approximately 1998, the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakaat Trading Company and other businesses affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating from the local Somali community in the form of donations to various Somali non-profits. However, the FBI new believes that the some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were involved in laundering the money.

According to the former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation, this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa’ida with funding through covert or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the former agent commented on the possible money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it’s connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Ladin, it might be an indication.

There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through charitable organizations. The Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is an Islamic non-governmental organization linked to terrorist support activities. According to a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ’s activities in support of terrorism include: suspicious money transfer, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad training. The Defense communication notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East. In January 2002, UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately $200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the UQ administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He returned with tens of thousands of dollars, according to the Department of Defense.

CIA, Treasury, and FBI officials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain Foundation’s ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the FBI’s

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November 18, 2002 response, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) has clear ties to the Saudi Government, and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical support to al-Qa’ida. In 1993, HIF established its U.S.-based office in Ashland, Oregon, and that office has since received approximately $700,000 from the parent offices in Saudi Arabia. The FBI has a pending investigation of HIF and the activities of the Portland HIF Office. As discussed above, the FBI has located correspondence between al-Bayoumi and the HIF. From the documents, it is clear that HIF was interested in appointing the imam of the mosque in Cajon, California, that al-Bayoumi managed.

The Treasury General Counsel testified about his agency’s concern about the foundation:

MR. AUFHAUSER: Second, and this is important point, it also rises out of Rick’s testimony, on al-Haramain, the two branch offices that we took a public and joint action against, al-Haramain really does represent a significant issue for the PCC and for terrorist financing and for the United States policy. It is, of course, the largest, I think the largest Islamic charity in the world. Its name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world. Its direct overseers are members of the Royal Family; significant contributors are members of the Royal Family. We don’t have a great deal of intelligence on the headquarters, about whether they are knowingly assisting people in al-Qa’ida and others; but in significant branch offices yet to be designated and under current investigation, we have ample evidence that large cash amounts are being couriered to those branch offices, that large wire transfers of money are being sent to those offices, that a great deal of the money is being dissipated through misspending, unaccounted for, and finally, that those offices have significant contacts with extremists, Islamic extremists.

CIA officials recently testified that they are making progress on their investigations of al-Haramain:

A year ago we had a lot of reporting suggesting branch offices were tied to al-Qa’ida... Over the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement information and we prepared a paper about a month, six weeks ago which assembled all of that... That paper gave us the first clear indication that the head of the central office is complicit in supporting terrorism, and it also raised questions about Prince Nayef.

Finally, [redacted], the subject of Phoenix and Portland FBI counterterrorism investigations, also has close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. [redacted] no longer resides in the United States, but is still the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI opened an

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investigation of [redacted] an employee of Saudi Arabian Airlines, in 1999 after receiving information [redacted] that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaida had been in contact with a telephone number associated with [redacted] in Portland. In May 2001, two individuals were arrested in Bahrain and later admitted they were on their way to blow up U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia. One of them had a passport that had been issued to one of [redacted] The FBI’s Phoenix Field Office also received source reporting in 1999 that [redacted] was checking security at the Southwest border and discussing the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States.

The FBI has developed information that [redacted] has close ties with one of the Saudi princes and accompanies him on many trips, including travel to the United States. According to the FBI, [redacted] was recently interrogated at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. He informed the FBI that [redacted] got the job at Saudi Arabian Airlines through his contacts. He said that [redacted] did not earn much money in this job, but that he "had another source of income through a Saudi prince" named Khalid al-Bandar. According to [redacted] performed miscellaneous tasks for the Prince, such as handling real estate matters and assisting the Prince’s grandmother. [redacted] traveled many places with the Prince, including Europe, and often to the United Arab Emirates. [redacted] made the cryptic comment that "nobody "knew everything about [redacted]." Although his name was on the State’s Department’s watchlist, [redacted] was apparently able to circumvent the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was traveling with the Saudi prince. The FBI only learned of the trip after the fact. Agents in the FBI’s Portland Field Office expressed their concern that [redacted] and others where using their status as Saudi Arabian Airlines employees as a cover to enable them to transport weapons in and out of the United States.


Lack of Saudi Cooperation in Counterterrorism Investigations

In testimony and interviews, a number of FBI agents and CIA offices complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks. For example, a veteran New York FBI agent stated that, from his

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point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years. In this agent’s opinion, the Saudis will only let only act when it is in their self-interest.

When a high-level [redacted] officer was asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing going to an example from the summer of 2001, when the U.S. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the U.S. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa’ida operation. The U.S. Government pressured the Saudi Government to locate him. The Saudis informed the U.S. Government that they required additional information to do so. The U.S. Government agency that had originally learned of this individual’s knowledge refused to provide the Saudis with additional information because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without the additional information.

According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For example, one FBI agent described one investigation after September 11 in which he provided the Saudi Government with copies of the subject’s Saudi passports. The Saudi Government maintained that they had no record of the subjects.

According to the former Chief of Alec Station, the unit in the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center established in 1996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating to Usama Bin Ladin. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center [redacted] stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on Bin Ladin because Bin Ladin had "too much information about official Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands." In a June 1997 memo to the DCI, Alec Station reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin. The former Chief of Alec Station thought that the U.S. Government’s hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi national interests.

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[redacted] testified on this issue on October 9, 2002:

On the issue of al-Qa’ida and Saudi intelligence, that goes back to our efforts to interact with the Saudi to get them to help is on investigating al-Qa’ida… For the most part it was a very troubled relationship where the Saudi’s were not providing us quickly or very vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. It was just very slow in coming.

Both FBI and CIA personnel cited an individual named Madani al-Tayyib as a specific case in which the Saudis were uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI had been pressuring the Saudis for years for permission to talk to al-Tayyib. According to the former head of ALEC Station, al-Tayyib managed all of Bin Ladin’s finances when Bin Ladin was in Sudan, and any expense over $1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al-Qa’ida figure who has since been arrested. In the summer of 1996, al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the FBI’s and the CIA’s request to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent, that al-Tayyib was "just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything."

The former chief of Alec Station also cited the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa is Bin Ladin’s brother-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa’ida. The U.S. Government arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentenced to death in absentia by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the U.S. agreed to extradite him to Jordan. The Jordanians then returning to Saudi Arabia. In the opinion of the CIA officer, the Saudis "bought off" the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa. According to the CIA officer, when Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by at least one important government official. Khalifa now works for a Riyadh-based NGO and travels and operates freely.

The General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department testified at the July 23, 2002 hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:

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There is an almost intuitive sense, however, the things are not being volunteered. So I want to fully inform you about it, that we have to ask and when we have to seek and we have to strive. I will give you one-and-a-half examples. The first is, after some period, the Saudis have agreed to the designation of a man named Julaydin, who is notoriously involved in all of this; and his designation will be public within the next 10 days. They came forward to us 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with the designation and a freeze order against Mr. Julaydin. We asked, what do you have on him? Because they certainly know what we have on him, because we shared it as we tried to convince them they that they ought to join us. The answer back was, nothing new.

MR. BEREUTER: Do you believe that?

MR. AUFHAUSER: No, I think that taxes credulity, or there is another motive we are not being told.


Status of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Investigations into Connections Between Terrorism and Saudi Government Officials

Both the FBI and the CIA have informed the Committees they are treating the Saudi issue seriously. According to the November 18, 2002 FBI response, the FBI and CIA have established a working group to look into the Saudi issue. The FBI formed a squad at the Washington Field Office [redacted] to investigate this issue and [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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However, both the FBI and the CIA still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government’s ties to terrorist elements. In the October 9, 2002 closed hearing, Director Mueller stated:

If I have one preliminary note of caution, it is that at this point there are more questions than answers, and I would caution against jumping to conclusions before we know a lot more.

A document located by the Joint Inquiry Staff confirms that the FBI’s Washington Field Office is still in the early stages of focusing on these investigations. In an August 15, 2002, communication, a field office agent stated that "[redacted] In that same document, the Washington Field Office asked [redacted]

[redacted] acknowledged in his testimony that the [redacted] understanding of this issue is limited as well:

With regard to the specific question of have we seen the Saudi intelligence services supporting terror groups, I think the record is not clear at all on that.

Both the FBI and CIA recognize the possibility that individuals connected to the Saudi Government may be providing support to terrorists.

[redacted] testified:

So there is certainly a good, good chance that there are sympathizers or extremists, sympathizers possibly for al-Qa’ida within the security services.

[redacted] also noted that:

Abu Zubaydah said he’s confident that al-Qa’ida must have contact certainly with Saudis in the United States and that al-Qa’ida and Usama Bin Ladin are particularly – they

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invest significant energy in cultivating what Abu Zubaydah called good relationships with Saudis of all standing... He said bin Ladin is very pleased when Saudis in the military, those successful in business and those close to the royal family to lend active support to his cause. He said bin Ladin actively seeks out such relationships.

Other CIA and FBI officials echoed these remarks in recent Congressional testimony.

[redacted] stated:

What we find troubling about the cases that we learned about from FBI, both the Los Angeles cases and some of the cases that the Washington Field Office has looked at, in which you’re seeing Saudi money going to people, is that it fits sort of a pattern that we’ve seen in terms of direct payments from the Saudis, the Saudi Government’s longstanding support for very fundamentalist Wahabi and Salafi charities and movements around the world, which in a sense you see the money is going to fundamentalists and you would be very surprised if some of its doesn’t bleed over into terrorist support… We’ve had a lot of suspicions before September 11 which we documented in a number of different papers, and again it’s a lot of smoke and the issues that come up are who knows about the payments, on whose behalf are the payments being made, are they being made on behalf of the central government or are they being made by a local official or a person. Do the people who are making the payments know what’s happening to the money? If they do know what’s happening, why are they making the payments? Is it a form of blackmail? Do they recognize the terrorist support? There’s the issue of are they regulating themselves as well as they are doing the due diligence that they ought to.

FBI Executive Assistant Director Pasquale D’Amuro testified at that same hearing:

To date I can't sit here and tell you that those ties go back, that we can prove that the Saudi royal family is sponsoring terrorism. But there’s enough smoke that we are conducting several investigations to try to determine what other information is out there.

What is clear is that the FBI did not treat the Saudis as a counterterrorism [redacted] threat prior to September 11, 2001.

[redacted]

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Michael Rolince, the former head of the International Terrorism Operations Section at FBI testified:

The answer to your question is pre-9/11 there were not any significant preliminary inquiry or full investigations, with relatively few exceptions, conducted by the FBI looking at Saudi [redacted] or support to terrorism... I’m not going to stand here, Ms. Hill, and tell you in any way, shape or form [redacted].

The former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego confirmed this in his testimony:

Basically [redacted]. They were not a country identified by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism. And the theme or the common modus operandi that we saw in San Diego was that if there were [redacted] there, their primary objective was to monitor dissidents in the interest of protecting the royal family. So they were not viewed as an inimical threat to national security.

In the October 9, 2002 closed hearing, Director Miller acknowledged that he became aware of some of the facts regarding the Saudi issue only as a result of the investigative work of the Joint Inquiry Staff:

I’m saying the sequence of events here, I still I think the staff probed and, as a result of the probing, some facts came to light here and to me, frankly, that had not come to light before, and perhaps would not have come to light had the staff not probed. That’s what I’m telling you. So I’m agreeing with you that the staff probing brought out facts that may not have come to this Committee."

Senator Dewine: But what you're also saying, though, is that that probing then brought facts to your attention.

Director Mueller: Yes.

(End of transcription)